A regular analysis of strategy, decisions and calls that impacted the week of NFL play -- with help from ESPN senior analytics specialist Brian Burke among other resources:
One of the most anticipated strategic changes this NFL season has arrived courtesy of what seems a minor rule change: Moving the touchback after kickoffs from the 20- to the 25-yard line. The NFL hopes to increase the number of touchbacks and reduce the number of returns, for safety reasons. But a host of coaches claimed in training camp that they would take measures to ensure the opposite effect.
That prediction proved accurate in the preseason, and the approach continued in Week 1 of the regular season. Coaches are not going to give up those 5 yards without a fight.
As the chart shows, touchbacks and kickoffs into the end zone have dropped significantly compared to the first week of the previous two seasons. With two Monday night games remaining, we still have a good statistical indication that teams are intentionally popping shorter kicks in an attempt to force a return and pin teams short of the 25-yard line.
You can debate whether the approach was effective; the average start of drives after kickoffs was the 24.0 yard line -- up almost 3 yards from last season and more than 4 from 2014. But it appears that many coaches are committed to testing this strategy within reason.
The most obvious example came in Sunday night's game between the New England Patriots and Arizona Cardinals. Patriots kicker Stephen Gostkowski had only two touchbacks on six kickoffs while playing indoors at University of Phoenix Stadium. While four of his kickoffs traveled into the end zone, they were shallow enough that the Cardinals returned them. The Patriots' cover teams pinned them inside the 20 three times, and the Cardinals started their average drive at a league-low 18.2-yard line.
Not every team followed that lead, of course. The Tennessee Titans did their best to avoid giving opportunities to Minnesota Vikings kickoff returner Cordarrelle Patterson, who led the NFL last season with an average of 31.8 yards per return. Two of the Titans' three adjusted kickoffs traveled out of the end zone; Patterson returned the third 61 yards to set up the Vikings' second-half comeback.
The San Diego Chargers and Indianapolis Colts, meanwhile, sent all of their kickoffs deep enough into the end zone that they went for touchbacks. The Colts were avoiding Lions returner Ameer Abdullah, who averaged 29.1 yards per return last season. The Chargers apparently didn't want any part of Kansas City Chiefs returner Knile Davis, who averaged 25.1 yards per return.
We shouldn't make too much of one week's worth of results. Traditionally, touchback numbers decrease over the course of the season as the weather worsens and kicking deep becomes more difficult. NFL senior vice president of officiating Dean Blandino said recently that the league won't begin analyzing the numbers on what is a one-year experiment until after four weeks of play. To this point, though, we've seen nothing to suggest that the league's intent -- to reduce kickoff returns as a whole -- will be achieved.
Why the timeout, Chuck Pagano?
End-game clock management is difficult and takes place under extreme pressure, but it's amazing how frequently coaches fail to think through highly consequential decisions before making them.
Consider the timeout Pagano took with 1:15 remaining in what proved to be a 39-35 loss to the Detroit Lions.
The situation: Pagano's Colts were trailing 34-28 and had just completed a pass to the Lions' 12-yard-line. Their top priority was to score a go-ahead touchdown, of course, but it was also important to leave the Lions offense -- which was destroying the Colts' injury-riddled defense -- with as little time as possible to respond.
Instead of allowing the clock to run to about 45 seconds before snapping the ball on second down, Pagano called a timeout to stop the clock at 1:15. He later told reporters the Colts had a personnel issue, and that he wanted to make sure they were set for the next play.
It's possible that Lions coach Jim Caldwell would have used one of his three timeouts at that moment to preserve time for his offense after a potential score. Pagano's decision pre-empted that. According to ESPN's win probability model, Pagano's timeout made it 3 percent more likely that the Colts would lose -- a big jump on a decision that seems so straightforward.
If Pagano truly wanted to address a personnel issue, he could have called the timeout just before the play clock expired. As it turned out, the Lions got the ball back with 37 seconds remaining and all three timeouts while trailing 35-34. The timeouts came in handy when two of their receivers failed to get out of bounds after receptions, and Matt Prater's 43-yard field goal with four seconds remaining proved to be the winner.
Jack Del Rio, redux
Oakland Raiders coach Jack Del Rio had some fun with ESPN's win probability model after his successful decision to go for two points near the conclusion of his team's 35-34 victory over the New Orleans Saints.
The model noted the Raiders had a 51 percent chance to win if Del Rio had kicked an extra point to tie the game at 34 with 47 seconds remaining. Going for two at that moment lowered the Raiders' chances to 44 percent.
The reaction, both from Del Rio and others, revealed an incomplete understanding of what those numbers mean and how they should be used. They are simply odds based on what has happened in previous situations. A two-point play is more difficult to convert than an extra point on average, and the Saints would still have time to respond. (Indeed, the Saints actually moved the ball 34 yards in 35 seconds and got close enough to try a 61-yard field goal as time expired.)
As with any decision, it is up to the coach to determine whether his team is in position to beat the odds, and if the game's circumstances support that approach. Del Rio made a judgment call based on the menu of two-point options he had relative to the Saints' porous defense. He also knew his own defense was struggling to contain the Saints' offense, a factor should overtime arise.
Win probability numbers aren't intended as a "how-to" guide for coaches. They provide historical information for the coach to consider among other factors. Del Rio was right to disregard them in favor of what he knew beyond them.
Fourth-quarter field goals doomed Jets
The New York Jets failed to score touchdowns from near the goal line on two possessions in the fourth quarter of a one-point loss to the Cincinnati Bengals. NFL coaches don't often "risk" the near-automatic field goal in favor a fourth-down play, but Jets coach Todd Bowles should have considered it more strongly on the first instance.
The Jets faced a fourth-and-goal from the 2-yard line at the end of a 12-play drive that had consumed six minutes, 34 seconds. Nick Folk's 20-yard field goal pulled the Jets within 20-19, but going for it would have given the Jets a 6-percent better chance of winning the game, according to ESPN's win probability model. In other words, the odds of scoring and taking the lead there were better than the odds of winning by attempting a field goal.
Most coaches would make the same decision Bowles did, and the Jets' offense wasn't having a great day on key plays. It finished with conversions on 4 of 12 third-down plays, but in his instance, Bowles would have been more than justified to take a more aggressive approach.
When the process is REALLY over
We've all heard about a receiver completing the process of a catch, right? Referee Ed Hochuli gave us an excellent view of when that happens just before halftime of the game in Indianapolis.
Colts receiver T.Y. Hilton made a diving catch of an 8-yard pass from quarterback Andrew Luck. As he fell to the ground, slid across the turf and rolled over, Hilton held the ball high in his right hand. At that moment, the ball came loose and hit the ground.
Was it a catch? NFL rules require a receiver going to the ground to maintain control of the ball throughout the process of the catch.
On review, Hochuli ruled it was a catch because Hilton controlled the ball until after he had "completely" rolled over. So this was one instance where a receiver could ultimately lose control of the ball but still be credited with a legal catch. The process was over. File that one away for safe keeping.