There had to be more to the story, right?

The Carolina Panthers cut loose an All-Pro cornerback with no guarantee of compensation and no indication of chronic injury, rancor or regime change. It would be easy to slam Panthers general manager Dave Gettleman for arrogance and incompetence, or at the very least impatience, after his decision to rescind cornerback Josh Norman's franchise tag. But after a move this rare and unconventional, it made sense to wait for an explanation before pouncing.

Gettleman didn't provide many details during a 20-minute news conference Thursday. In the end, he said, "this was a business decision" -- a catch-all cliché we hear from front-office executives across every sport and league. But parting ways with Norman now, and in this way, makes more sense for the Panthers than the current narrative suggests.

So allow me to make Gettleman's case for him. We can do it without taking a single thing away from Norman, who is one of the best active players at his position in football.

1. The Panthers build from the inside-out

Whether you agree with him or not, Gettleman has prioritized the Panthers' offensive and defensive lines over wide receiver or secondary. They're committed to it and that's the first stop for their non-quarterback salary-cap space.

En route to the Super Bowl last season, the Panthers had about $50 million in cap space devoted to their defensive and offensive lines. Receivers and defensive backs accounted for $13 million in cap space, per ESPN Stats & Information figures.

"Big guys keep you competitive," Gettleman said Thursday, echoing the philosophy of one of his mentors, Tom Coughlin.

If that's the case, if you're operating with a plan that makes it is more important to keep players such as defensive linemen Kawann Short, Star Lotulelei and Kony Ealy, you're going to have a more limited budget for Norman. On average, cornerbacks are the third-most expensive position in the NFL after quarterbacks and pass-rushing defensive ends. Something has to give.

"You can't keep everybody," Gettleman said. "It's impossible. So now you've got to decide who you are going to allow to graduate. We've got some really good young talent."

Given the nature of the Panthers' success in the past two seasons, especially defensively, it's difficult to argue with the approach they've taken.

2. Norman wanted elite money

By most accounts, Norman was seeking a long-term deal that paid him at least $15 million and perhaps $16 million -- a 14 percent raise over the highest end of the market.

Perhaps that would have been negotiable as the July 22 deadline for long-term deals approached, but if your organizational philosophy is to prioritize the interior lines, you're probably not going to pay elite money to someone -- at least, someone who isn't Cam Newton or Luke Kuechly -- who plays another position.

And to be fair, there are only three teams at the moment who have chosen to pay a cornerback even $14 million annually: The Arizona Cardinals (Patrick Peterson), the New York Jets (Darrelle Revis) and the Seattle Seahawks (Richard Sherman). It's not for everybody.

3. Age was a factor

Norman will turn 29 in December. Every player ages differently, but each team performs age analysis in these situations. There's a reason most big contracts go to those who are 26 or very close to it.

Even now, long before final roster decisions are being contemplated, there are only 10 cornerbacks on NFL rosters older than 31, according to ESPN Stats & Information. The Cincinnati Bengals' Adam Jones (32) was the only one among them to make the Pro Bowl last season.

This isn't to say Norman is nearing the end of his career or even past his prime. Again, every player is different. But giving him a long-term deal at the terms he was seeking means committing elite-level money into his early 30s, a period when most cornerbacks are in decline, moving to safety or already out of the league. The odds are against him.

Even Revis, who turned 30 last summer, seemed to have taken a step back in 2015. NFL teams pay for future production, not past accomplishments.

4. The compensatory pick deadline was approaching

Gettleman said the sides were too far apart to make a long-term deal possible. But it's fair to ask why he didn't wait until the last possible moment before making that determination, or why he didn't try to trade Norman first.

On the former, any free agent who signs after May 12 doesn't count in the compensatory pick formula. So Gettleman could have waited until July, hoping Norman would give in on his demands. But if the sides remained at an impasse, and the Panthers rescinded at that point, they would have missed out on a big boost to their chances for a high compensatory pick in return.

As for a trade, you might recall that in 2013, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers acquired Revis in exchange for the No. 13 overall pick in the draft. Revis turned 28 that summer. Why couldn't the Panthers get something similar for Norman?

The Revis deal, which ultimately led to Revis' departure after just one year, is a cautionary tale about the limited impact even an elite cornerback can have. The guess here is that Gettleman got a good-enough idea of Norman's trade value via informal discussions to know he wouldn't improve substantially over the seeming likelihood of a third-round compensatory pick.

There's a fair counterargument to be made here, namely that the Panthers should have simply kept Norman for one more year on the franchise tag given how close they were last season to winning a championship. You could argue that making a philosophical exception for an elite player is good management, not a lack of discipline.

Gettleman made clear Thursday that he "doesn't subscribe to the one-player-away theory" and doesn't view his team as having a short "window" into winning a championship.

What he really meant, of course, was that he doesn't view Norman's presence over that of another talented player as a substantial upgrade to his team's long-term championship hopes.

Gettleman knows he'll have an excellent defensive front and a coaching staff that has already proved it can develop young cornerbacks.

Time will tell on that judgment. But I think there was a method to Gettleman's madness, one backed by steady roster-building progress in his four years with the Panthers. We shall see, of course, but sometimes it's worth considering all facets of a decision before pouncing.