The Royals have had a mixed offseason, with the surprisingly inexpensive (in relative terms) deal to bring Alex Gordon back and a good buy-low deal with Dillon Gee on one side and the huge deal with declining Joakim Soria on the other. The reigning World Series champs certainly have money to spend, and they still had a need for some bulk innings in a rotation filled with potential but light on pitchers who are solid bets to throw 180 innings.

But Ian Kennedy's contract is way beyond a rational projection of his performance, giving $14 million a year to a chronically homer-prone pitcher who's performed like a fifth starter in two of the last three seasons.

Kennedy works heavily with his straight, below-average four-seamer, and he gets punished for it, with that pitch accounting for two-thirds of the homers he gave up in 2015, his worst year to date for surrendering the long ball. He has had only one truly above-average season in the majors, in 2011, posting a low walk rate and low home run rate in the same year for the only time in his career. He was around replacement-level in two of the past three seasons, even with the benefit of pitching a bunch of games in Petco Park in that period.

With his current stuff -- which is unlikely to improve -- and pitch mix, he likely will be at or just below the AL median in strikeout rate and likely to continue to walk too many guys for a finesse right-hander while giving up 25-30 homers if he goes 200 innings. That's going to add up to a below-average result, and for $14 million, the Royals need more.

The real issue I have with the deal, however, is the length rather than the salary. If the Royals believe pitching coach Dave Eiland -- who was with Kennedy with the in New York in 2007-08 -- can make an adjustment or two, that's a great reason to sign the player . . . to a one- or two-year deal, not a five-year deal that seems to bank a little bit on Kennedy improving in 2016-17 and then opting out.

There's more downside than upside here for the Royals, and even with the big revenue boost they should receive off their 2015 World Series win, they will have a hard time carrying a contract like this if it goes south and they need to spend more money to fill the same need.

The signing leaves Kansas City with six major league starters on the roster, not counting prospect Miguel Almonte, who could probably use a half-season or more in Triple-A, so someone will be bumped to the minors or the bullpen to start the year. Kris Medlen and Danny Duffy both have had Tommy John surgery, with Medlen getting it twice, so signing Kennedy could let K.C. keep both pitchers well-rested by using them in swing roles, alternating starts by matchups or by who could use a little more rest. The bullpen is certainly deep enough for the team to do something innovative to try to keep everyone strong and healthy for another October run.

Davis gets his deal: The Orioles bid against themselves on Chris Davis and they lost, signing a player who has had two seasons that were even solid-average in his career to a seven-year, $161 million contract that covers his age 30-36 seasons.

Davis hit .196/.300/.404 in 2014, then, while having an excellent season in 2015, still had the American League's highest strikeout rate (by a wide margin), worst contact rate and second-worst swinging strike rate (stats courtesy of Fangraphs). Power like Davis' is scarce today and I understand any team placing a premium on it, but he has been a $23 million player only twice in his career, is not going to get any better entering his 30s, and had no other probable landing spot this offseason. No team besides Baltimore had the opening at first base and the money to pay anything close to this except possibly the Rangers, who had Davis once before, trading him to Baltimore with Tommy Hunter for Koji Uehara, and have numerous internal options at first that wouldn't require this level of expenditure.

Baltimore needed Davis' bat to have a respectable lineup in 2016, but this contract seems to assume that the 2015 version is the one most likely to recur during the next seven years, when Davis' own history tells us that's not very probable.