The MLB offseason has been historically slow, mostly due to the coronavirus pandemic (and the associated revenue problems), but having a new collective bargaining agreement due next winter (and the associated labor fights until then) is also a factor. Although the major free agents in this winter's class still haven't signed, there has finally been some real movement, courtesy of San Diego Padres general manager A.J. Preller:
The Chicago Cubs will trade Yu Darvish and Victor Caratini to the Padres for Zach Davies, Yeison Santana, Reggie Preciado, Owen Caissie and Ismael Mena;
The Tampa Bay Rays traded Blake Snell to the Padres for Luis Patino, Blake Hunt, Cole Wilcox and Francisco Mejia;
Ha-Seong Kim signed with the Padres for at least four years and roughly $25 million.
A couple other moves (Pirates traded Josh Bell to the Nationals, Rangers signed Kohei Arihara, Dodgers signed Tommy Kahnle, Tigers signed Jose Urena) happened, but these three were the most notable and also had a common thread between them, other than the Padres: economics as a primary motivator. Let's take a quick detour into that, then into how these moves affect all three teams.
Economics colliding with feelings
Money is the elephant in the room on these moves. It makes any bite-sized analysis on Twitter fraught, particularly when a popular big-market club trades a famous player. Thoughts about the Cubs' big-picture approach to the next few seasons, or the strategy behind choosing a certain kind of prospect in a trade can quickly dissolve into a fight about the franchise's payroll.
Fans don't like when their team gets rid of good players and doesn't get good players back.
I grew up in Tampa and have some friends who are Rays fans. They've experienced the feeling of trading a good player many times. One texted me Monday and asked if the Rays did well in the Snell trade. I said they did. He's stopped asking why the Rays had to do this, partly because they keep doing it and partly because they seem to be good every year with a bottom-five payroll while still doing this. It stinks for baseball that its best-run team either has to or chooses to operate with this payroll and thus holds mini-fire-sales every year, but this is what's happening, and at least the Rays are really good at it.
The Cubs' situation is much more difficult. Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer won a World Series and built a mostly homegrown contender. It faded quicker than anyone expected, both from bad luck and bad execution. Owner Tom Ricketts was heavily leveraged when he bought the team and continued spending to improve Wrigley Field and surrounding areas while also running a high payroll. Then coronavirus hit and revenues tanked, particularly those tied to the game-day experience, which is where a lot of Ricketts' spending and debt was focused. Teams that make a high percentage of their revenue from game-day operations were hit the hardest, with the Cubs near the top of that list.
This eventually leads to a payroll ... let's call it a "situation."
The timing of this couldn't be worse for the Cubs. It became clear months ago that they were going to cut payroll in a meaningful way. The issue is they have a win-now, veteran team, and many of the better and more highly paid players (Javier Baez, Anthony Rizzo, Kris Bryant) are on expiring contracts, so trading them nets less than usual. This signals that 2021 isn't a contending year, while not bringing enough talent in return to speed up the rebuild/reload.
What's unclear is if it was an ownership mandate or baseball operations decision to trade Darvish to cut multiple years of payroll, rather than do something like what the Reds did (non-tendering Archie Bradley, trading Raisel Iglesias, not spending in free agency thus far) to cut payroll for 2021 but not affect 2022 and avoid leaning toward more of a rebuild situation.
This Darvish trade comes at a time when few teams want to add payroll and many are at least acting like they can't add any at all. Getting into this spot financially and personnel-wise was a combination of bad luck, bad planning and bad execution. The pandemic made it worse and sped up the day that tough decisions would have to be made. The personnel decisions haven't been great lately and the luck has been bad, but this team shouldn't be spending this far below the competitive balance tax threshold unless someone has royally screwed up the finances.
Eventually, this led to trading the second-best starting pitcher in baseball in 2020 (per FanGraphs WAR) for a package of prospects without any in the top 150 in baseball. The price would've been much higher a year ago and will likely be higher a year from now. Being in a financial bind right now has a price much higher than just not signing any free agents or pressing pause on extension negotiations.
The Cubs doing Bryant dirty (and getting away with it) to get an extra year of team control, all to have close to zero trade value and indirectly help force a payroll cut in that final year is almost Shakespearean, maybe more Twilight Zone than anything else. I'm not going to say that this moment is the karmic trade Cubs fans have to accept for winning a World Series title, but the Royals are going through a similar thing, and the big-market Giants have had lean seasons in the wake of their run of titles. It's great to build a perennial powerhouse that competes every year, but there's only a handful of those types of teams at a time. At least you aren't Jets fans.
The Rays trading Snell with three years of an affordable contract after he was their ace for a World Series run isn't good for baseball. The way to keep this from happening, which is in everyone's interest, is to figure out how to meaningfully raise the Rays payroll, which is probably only possible via moving them or getting a new stadium (or drastically changing the league's salary structure, which is even less likely). Everyone involved has been trying to solve this for over a decade. The bottom line is there will always be low payroll teams, and they will always trade good players to save money or help future contention. The sport has not figured out how to eliminate this reality. In this case, the best-run team in baseball is doing it, so it seems like less of a competitive problem and more of a required, semi-regular bummer.
The Cubs weren't going to be good forever, and some clubs were going to get hit harder than others by the pandemic. The Cubs were trending toward tougher competitive times and tough financial decisions naturally, and they did some things to make it worse on the management and ownership front, and some things they can't control also contributed. It's not good to see a big-market club in a position like this, but a vaccine and all that comes with it will eventually solve a good bit of it (at some point), and better planning and execution can solve the rest. The Dodgers were in all kinds of trouble when they were sold in 2012 and are now the second-best-run organization in baseball.
Now let's analyze the three teams involved in these three deals.
The Rays
Tampa Bay keeps doing what it does so well: running a personnel perpetual motion machine. The Rays have had the best farm system in baseball for over a year and now they are running away. When I run the numbers, they may well have over 50% more value in their farm system than any other team.
From watching what former Rays GM Andrew Friedman is doing with the Dodgers, you can see what would happen if this was done with a bigger payroll, but there's a reason why the Rays are the most fertile soil for cultivating general managers. They do the most with what they're given.
Snell is near the peak of his value, cheap enough that any team could afford him, a front-line lefty with playoff experience in his peak with three years of team control. Given their payroll, pitching depth and pitching development, along with how they deploy pitchers in game, Snell was worth less to the Rays than some other teams. You can see how Snell's salary impacted the price San Diego paid, as Darvish is a better pitcher and fetched far less.
The headliner in the deal, RHP Luis Patino, was my 11th-ranked prospect in baseball entering 2020, and while his MLB debut in 2021 featured some command problems, I don't see it as a long-term concern. It's somewhat typical for power-armed youngsters to struggle with corralling their stuff early in their big league careers, but Patino has the long-term indicators (arm action, athleticism) to suggest he'll have enough command to start.
One team told me last winter that their internal metrics said Patino had the best raw stuff in the minors, with a fastball and breaking ball that are both 70s on the 20-80 scale to analytics and to eyeball scouts, along with a changeup that's anywhere from a 50 (MLB average) to 60 (well above) depending on the day. There's real parallels in terms of trajectory (their bodies aren't similar) with RHP Tyler Glasnow, who became a front-line arm soon after arriving in Tampa Bay. Patino may need some minor league time in 2021, but he should be a real factor by 2022, possibly in 2021.
C Blake Hunt was one of the biggest winners from fall instructional league, the first setting where rival scouts could watch minor league players from other clubs. He was already a solid defender with some power, but his offensive impact has progressed to where he looks like one of the top 100 to 150 prospects in baseball, a potential starter who could be ready as soon as 2022. He was a high school pick in 2017, 69th overall, but it's fair to consider him comparable to a mid-first-round college catcher from the 2020 draft.
RHP Cole Wilcox went in the third round of last summer's draft, but he signed for first-round money and I graded him as a mid-to-late first-round talent. He's pretty polished, big and athletic, throws strikes and checks a lot of boxes, with three pitches that all flash plus potential. The issue is his fastball is hittable (will need some added deception and/or pitch design tweaks), and he rarely has both his good slider and changeup for the duration of an outing.
C Francisco Mejia is the fourth player in the deal and is more of a reclamation project. He was a top-50 prospect in baseball before the Padres acquired him, but there was growing skepticism at the time of the trade to his ultimate fit. That ended up being well-founded as he's just OK defensively behind the plate, but he has plenty of arm to play anywhere, though doesn't really have a good defensive home. He's ideal for robot umps, but that's still a ways away. He has above average bat control and raw power, but an overaggressive approach that undermines both. As a switch-hitting, versatile player with everyday tools, he fits the types of players the Rays carry on their bench, though he also has one more option remaining, so he can be sent to Triple-A if the Rays find better.
The Rays did well in terms of return for Snell, once you get past the fact that they traded a player like this. They got a nice mix of short-term MLB help, long-term upside and overall bulk of young talent. If you do a surplus value-style calculation, the Rays are the winners at this point, but the performance of Snell and Patino will likely dictate which team will win this deal. Rays GM Erik Neander did a solid job of recognizing his leverage in having the best pitcher on the market (combination of talent and salary) and extracting full value from a motivated buyer. That said, the goal is to win, not to have the best farm system, so there's still plenty of room for the Padres to win this deal. These four players could all wash out, or Patino could be better than Snell for the next three years.
The "sell high or pretty high on an established star with some real guaranteed money, but a good bit of control" act tends to go well for the Rays. The Chris Archer deal was the heist of the century (Tyler Glasnow, Austin Meadows, and Shane Baz). The Evan Longoria deal was well-timed to shed roughly $60 million for a declining franchise icon. Trading David Price primarily landed Willy Adames, avoiding losing Price for just a draft pick. Trading starters about to come into paydays closer to their market value (Matt Moore, Steven Souza) landed cheaper, useful talent (Colin Poche, Matt Duffy), while buying low on young relievers for decent prospects was more fruitful (Nick Anderson, Pete Fairbanks).
The bottom line is, the Rays win more trades than they lose, and a draw is about as bad as they've done of late. They should've kept Trea Turner in the Wil Myers trade of 2014. They will probably lose their previous deal with San Diego (trading Tommy Pham and Jake Cronenworth for prospect Xavier Edwards and since non-tendered Hunter Renfroe).
Rumors persist that the Rays will look into trading their only 2021 salary above $7 million, center fielder Kevin Kiermaier. That wouldn't hurt the team much, given Randy Arozarena and Manuel Margot waiting in the wings as potential replacements. After trading Snell and declining the $15 million option on new Braves RHP Charlie Morton, that certainly gives the Rays some money to spend on free agency to fill a few holes, but it's hard to believe it'll come on big multiyear deals.
Nobody loves the fire-sale optics here, but it landed the Rays in the World Series, so the context has to be more ballin' on a budget than Jeffrey Loria's experiments in exploiting baseball's economic framework.
The Cubs
It's unclear if there's more cost-cutting to come, but indications are that this may have gotten the Cubs into a range that they can manage for 2021. The bigger questions for the Cubs, discussed in my offseason outlooks, is what they'll be in 2022. Rizzo, Baez and Bryant are set to be free agents, and it's hard to see the Cubs signing more than one of them, unless their markets really collapse or league revenues don't rebound. The 2021 club, if adding a couple vets on one-year deals to fill holes, is still competitive in the NL Central, which seems like the plan. The division isn't strong and also appears to be cutting payroll across the board, so there's still an opportunity to make a playoff run here even if this team doesn't look like it would get deep.
It's worth noting that there wasn't an easy way to cut payroll here and not make the 2021 team notably worse. The other options would be to trade Bryant for a smaller return that wouldn't net a good, lower-salary big leaguer; trade Rizzo in a walk year for a solid-to-good prospect; or trade Kyle Hendricks on an affordable deal, likely less than Darvish fetched. I'm not defending Ricketts' or Hoyer's decisions here, but if you grant that payroll was going to be cut, fans were going to be mad about any of those moves; there was no way to escape both of them being seen as villains. The other 29 clubs' appetites for adding salary meant the return for trading a player with a big salary, regardless of quality, was going to be depressed.
It's interesting that Hoyer targeted multiple lower-level lottery-ticket types, as opposed to fewer players closer to the big leagues, or taking on Wil Myers' contract to get one of the Padres elite prospects. Getting back Davies (basically on a market-rate, one-year deal; San Diego didn't need him with Snell/Darvish) helps prop up a shot at contending in 2021. Moving Caratini opens a spot for prospect C Miguel Amaya to hopefully become a cornerstone and eventually allow for a decision on Willson Contreras' future in Chicago. Getting lower-level lottery tickets suggests that Hoyer sees buying low on upside types, hoping they improve in the next few years and creating value via scouting and development as his best way out of this jam.
Another avenue would've been to load up on lower upside, close-to-the-majors types or get one good young big leaguer, but that also doesn't really upgrade organizational depth. If the goal is to be the Dodgers or the Yankees as an org (it should be), then this can't be fixed with a couple shrewd upper minors finds. The Cubs need to become a machine that creates value via scouting and development/coaching, and these types of prospects have the biggest gap between what they are now and what they could be, even soon via increased trade value. Hit on two of these players (i.e. they become top 100 prospects and eventually solid everyday players) and the rebuild goes a year quicker, starting to look more like a reload. I'm not saying this switch to trading for lower minors prospects should necessarily be flipped right now with a "last dance" quality to the 2021 club, but it needed to be done at some point.
SS Yeison Santana, 20, is the best prospect right now of this group and was my breakout pick last winter for the 2020 minor league season that never happened. He was a helium prospect at this time last year, adding to his solid defensive fit at shortstop with more pop and contact skills to go with an already solid approach and one of the best swings in the system. He has a good shot to open 2021 in Low-A.
OF Owen Caissie, 18, was the 45th overall pick last summer out of a Canadian high school. He was a draft model favorite due to being young for the class, a 6-foot-4 athlete with strong measurables including exit velocity and loft. He hasn't played a pro game yet, like Preciado and Mena, but he has everyday upside in right field, with a considerable amount of risk and uncertainty since he wasn't on the summer showcase circuit, so the track record is pretty short.
3B Reggie Preciado, 17, was the top prospect from the Padres' 2019 July 2 class, signing for $1.3 million out of Panama. He's a lanky, 6-4 switch hitter who is a shortstop for now but likely slides over to third base. The early returns from two falls of instructs are that there's real hit-and-power upside and a sure fit on the left side of the infield. Until he plays real pro games, he also has considerable risk, but has a little more scouting track record since he has been on the scene for about two years, leading up to his signing and his short unofficial pro experience.
OF Ismael Mena, 18, was another signee in that 2019 J2 class, signing for $2.2 million out of the Dominican Republic. He also hasn't played a pro game and is 6-3, swings lefty and has a real shot to play center field long-term, but is projectable enough he could fill out and move to a corner. He's behind Preciado in terms of prospect value, but also flashes hit/power/speed upside, though with more contact questions than Preciado, but more track record than Caissie.
One criticism by Cubs fans was that these players are too far away, which is fair -- it's a specific choice Hoyer made. Another was that there were no pitchers in this haul, which to me is akin to fans complaining about the big league team's needs during the draft. The Cubs need to get the best players they can in this trade, the same way that they need to draft the best player they can find at their high picks. They need talent at all levels and of all types, so the positions of the players in this trade is a non-issue. I'll have a full rundown of every farm system later this winter, but this trade puts the Cubs farm at league average at best, likely somewhere around 20th.
The Padres
And now for the straightforward, fun part of this. The Padres are a good, young, exciting team that went for it last year, and now they're continuing to go for it, with ownership that's committed to giving management the money to do it. That's just refreshing to write.
As discussed in the Rays portion, I think the Padres overpaid a bit for Snell in terms of value, but there's still plenty of room for Snell or Patino to over/underperform and shift that math. It's also worth noting the Padres look to have won the last trade between these two teams. The goal is to win championships, and if Snell is an affordable ace for a championship winner while Patino is anything less than a future ace, then the Padres win this deal.
The aggression of Preller, sometimes leading to underwater contracts to Myers, Matt Kemp, and Eric Hosmer, can also lead to deals like this Darvish one. Roughly $30 million came off the books after the 2020 season, ownership appears to have committed to keeping payroll at about the same level to keep competing, and Snell and Darvish together make about $30 million in 2021. The same doggedness that Preller has in lobbying ownership and pursuing all trade possibilities was also what led to building the second-best farm system in baseball, a near bottomless supply of young talent, the most valuable currency that can underwrite almost any trade.
When I crystallized my thoughts about a GM's approach to his job via a matrix, Preller was in a unique spot. He's the only GM with a top-five system, above average payroll upside, young team on the rise and an aggressive, scouting-leaning mindset. So he's the only GM doing what he's doing, at a time when there's certain strategies where almost a third of the league are doing pretty close to the same thing. It's kinda wild that a GM executing a traditional rebuild correctly and aggressively trying to win a title is an outlier, but that's where we are right now. Some notable examples of this in the past includes a lot of World Series titles: Dayton Moore/Royals, Brian Sabean/Giants and Mike Rizzo/Nationals. You could even include Theo Epstein and the Cubs in that group.
The team is basically set right now, and is a top-two team in baseball, right with the division rival and defending World Series champ Dodgers. I'll have a more detailed answer later this winter, but the Padres' farm system is probably still in the top-10, mostly because they've still only traded one of their premium prospects through all of these moves (Patino).
I almost forgot that the Padres also handed out the second-biggest guaranteed contract of the winter, to 25-year-old South Korean shortstop Ha-Seong Kim. Reviews of him range from solid utility type who lacks offensive impact to solid everyday shortstop. The questions circle around how well his offensive game will translate from the KBO (generally between a Double-A and Triple-A level of competition), where there isn't anywhere near the same kind of velocity or raw stuff.
Analytics types like Kim the most, as his numbers and age appear to translate into a strong everyday player, while scouts are a little more skeptical that he'll hit the ground running and feel he will need a break-in period to adjust to the big league game. Bottom line is he's a young, sure-handed shortstop with upside and can play multiple positions and can at least be a contributor in 2021. Great teams almost always have a couple too many good position players and that's the Padres now.
The question now is how long Preller can keep this competitive window pried open. As the key players will rise in cost (Fernando Tatis Jr. hits arbitration in 2022, Trent Grisham, Austin Nola, Jake Cronenworth in 2023), a couple of their big contracts are front-loaded and will go down a bit in the coming years (Darvish and Hosmer). Some players making decent money will come off the books (Pham after 2021, Myers after 2022) and young, everyday players will come up (LHP MacKenzie Gore, C Luis Campusano, LHP Ryan Weathers will be next, with the following wave of SS/CF C.J. Abrams, CF Robert Hassell, and CF Hudson Head) as cost-effective replacements.
The Padres look set for another three years of serious contention without any real sign of a terrible contract to undermine them; only Manny Machado has the potential to become that right now.