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          2023 NFL playoffs: 18 unsung plays from divisional round games

          Josh Allen averaged just 4.8 yards per pass attempt in the loss to the Chiefs, though he added 72 rushing yards and had three total scores. Photo by Timothy T Ludwig/Getty Images
          • Bill BarnwellJan 22, 2024, 08:30 AM ET
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              Bill Barnwell is a senior NFL writer for ESPN.com. He analyzes football on and off the field like no one else on the planet, writing about in-season X's and O's, offseason transactions and so much more.

              He is the host of the Bill Barnwell Show podcast, with episodes released weekly. Barnwell joined ESPN in 2011 as a staff writer at Grantland.
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          Well, the NFL divisional round did not lack for drama. After a wild-card round with five blowouts, three of the four games over the weekend came down to the final meaningful possession for the trailing team. After a second-half surge by the Ravens, we saw a late comeback win for the 49ers, a game-sealing interception for the Lions and the latest in a series of harrowing playoff losses for the Bills at the hands of the rival Chiefs.

          There's a lot to talk about. There were a few plays that stood out to me in each game, and the simplest way to talk about what we saw might just be running through those plays and why they were interesting. In some cases, they were schematically fun and stood out for how they helped win or lose the game. Some were game-changing sequences, while others were lost in the shuffle. Many will hint at how the winning teams will fare in the conference title games this Sunday.

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          Since it's my column, I chose the plays and sequences that seemed most interesting to me as opposed to the ones that might have impacted the game most significantly. This isn't a win expectancy column. You don't need me to tell you Jordan Love's interception was a bad decision or that Tyler Bass' 44-yard field goal attempt to tie the game late wasn't a great kick. Instead, I want to take a closer look at what drove these games and the plays that might have mattered more than you think.

          I'll start with the final game of the round -- one of the most dramatic of the season. On a day Josh Allen played unlike his usual self and spent most of the evening dumping the ball off short, one of the few shots the star quarterback took downfield might have ended up helping cost Buffalo the game, even if it was the right decision:

          Jump to a matchup:
          Texans-Ravens | Packers-49ers
          Bucs-Lions | Chiefs-Bills

          Chiefs 27, Bills 24

          The situation: Second-and-9, Bills ball at the Chiefs' 26-yard line, 2:00 to go in the fourth quarter

          The play: Josh Allen passes up an easy completion underneath to go for a home run, only for his attempt to fall incomplete.

          Before the final drive, I thought Allen was playing something close to perfect football. The Chiefs clearly wanted to take away the big plays from the Bills' passing attack and were willing to dare Allen to repeatedly take checkdowns and run the ball. Over and over again, throughout this game, he got to those throws. The Bills ran the ball 39 times for 182 yards, with Allen scoring twice. Offensive coordinator Joe Brady used six offensive linemen on 21 snaps to get Kansas City out of its sub-packages and into its base defense, with Buffalo running on 19 of those 21 snaps.

          Through the first 50 minutes, 57.1% of the plays the Bills ran against the Chiefs were successful in terms of adding expected points added (EPA) to their total/keeping the offense ahead of schedule. That was their second-best mark of the season and the best performance any team has had all year by success rate against the Chiefs. There weren't many big plays, but the Bills were able to consistently move the ball, control the clock, keep their defense off the field and score when Allen made magic happen with a mix of scrambles, impossible throws and even an early-game lateral that hearkened back to the end of the regular-season matchup between these two.

          On the final drive of the season for the Bills, though, Allen took two shots to take the lead with big plays. The opening snap saw Stefon Diggs in single coverage against Justin Reid. Allen turned down a checkdown to James Cook to launch a pass 63.4 yards in the air to Diggs, who had the ball go through his hands. You can't fault Allen for taking the matchup -- and the throw was immaculate -- but it hinted at a play later on in the drive that had an even bigger impact.

          After the two-minute warning, the Bills were in field goal range and clearly trying to chew up as much clock as possible before either scoring a touchdown or tying the game. Facing a second-and-9, Allen dropped back and immediately had Diggs, his best receiver, running open on a drag route the Chiefs were in between passing off. He never even looked toward Diggs. Allen stared down the left side of the field the entire time and attempted to toss up a skinny post to Khalil Shakir, who was splitting between Trent McDuffie and Chamarri Conner. Pressure from Chris Jones prevented him from stepping into the throw, and while he made some impossible throws in tight spaces during this game, this pass fell incomplete.

          Now, as someone who is not a quarterback and doesn't like to second-guess reads, let me be clear: This wasn't a bad throw from Allen, and I don't think it was the wrong decision. If he think he has a touchdown, it's going to be incredibly difficult to not take that shot. Conner, a backup safety playing because of injuries to Bryan Cook and Mike Edwards, took the slightest of steps to widen out just before Allen made his decision to throw behind him. I think Allen knew he wanted to work the backup safety with this route combination, and with a perfect throw, it still might have been a touchdown.

          Again, I'm not saying what Allen should have done, but instead contrasting his decision on this play with what he had actually been doing for most of the contest. His average completion traveled 0.7 yards in the air. That's the shortest average completion distance he has ever had in a game by a considerable margin; the second shortest was 3.3 yards in the air. He was tied for the record for most completions behind the line of scrimmage of any game in the NFL Next Gen Stats era.

          The Bills also clearly emphasized getting the ball out of Allen's hands quickly to avoid situations in which the pass rush could influence his throws. His average completion came after holding the ball for just 2.3 seconds; that's his sixth-quickest rate across 91 career starts. His throw to Shakir came after 3.2 seconds. On a day when the Bills were clearly telling him to get the ball out fast, if he hits the shallow route to Diggs, the pass rush probably doesn't have time to get home.

          If Dalton Kincaid can occupy Nick Bolton -- who was in coverage on the tight end -- after a potential Diggs catch, he's getting a first down and moving the Bills inside the 15-yard line. That's something closer to a chip shot field goal, allows them to either wind clock or force the Chiefs to start using timeouts, and sets up a potential king-slaying touchdown from the Buffalo offense in the final minute. Instead, the Chiefs held up on third-and-9 and forced Allen to throw the ball out of bounds, and Bass missed the 44-yarder that would have tied the game at 27.

          Ideally, none of this should have mattered. If offensive tackle Dion Dawkins holds up a little better against Jones, maybe this is a touchdown. If Bass hits the field goal, it probably doesn't matter. If Allen hits Diggs, maybe Bass still misses the kick. More than anything, I found it so fascinating that Allen managed to play such a constrained, deliberate, patient game for so long and then couldn't resist the urge to take his shot out of the two-minute warning. I can't fault him for going after a backup safety and trying to throw the game-winning touchdown, but after successfully taking so many checkdowns throughout the game, taking that shot may haunt the Bills during the offseason, even if it was the right decision.

          The situation: Third-and-10, Bills ball on their own 43-yard line, 5:44 to go in the fourth quarter

          The play: Allen fumbles during a scramble, the Chiefs fail to recover and then the Bills convert fourth down and slow everything down.

          There's a lot to break down here. The one mistake Allen clearly made on the final drive was losing the ball while scrambling on third down. Jones did an incredible job of knocking the ball out, but as he crawled to recover it, Kincaid knocked it away. Conner had the first chance at a clear recovery and attempted to scoop the ball and score, but he failed to do so, with the Bills then making the recovery. I don't want to second-guess Allen, but as a society, we can collectively say that falling on the football as opposed to scooping and scoring is a shared fundamental we all know. Conner getting away from that nearly cost Kansas City the game.

          On the ensuing fourth-and-3, the Bills brought Shakir in orbit motion and used what amounted to a massive pick play to get him open for an easy first down. McDuffie appeared to be in coverage and couldn't make it across the field, and Reid wasn't able to sniff it out quickly enough in the flat to prevent Shakir from picking up 10 yards. The only downside for the Bills is Shakir went out of bounds, stopping the clock with 4:46 to go.

          I can't recall a team being as deliberate about using the clock while trailing late in the fourth quarter as the Bills were on this drive. It was already something that was happening before the fourth-down conversion, but it became clear afterward that Buffalo was doing everything in its power to make this the final possession of the game. After a Kincaid catch in bounds, the Bills ran their next play at 4:05. The next one was at 3:20. After that, James Cook's 1-yard run on a play that started at 2:42 took the game to the two-minute warning. They essentially wiped three minutes off the clock with three plays. If Allen had checked down to Diggs on the two-minute play, they either would have run 40 more seconds off the clock or forced the Chiefs to start using their timeouts.

          For an organization still scarred by the 13-second drive that tied the game in the divisional round two years ago, you can understand why Buffalo coach Sean McDermott was trying to bleed as much clock as possible. The ideal scenario was going to see the Bills score a touchdown and go up four with as little time left for Patrick Mahomes as possible. Failing that, McDermott wanted to tie the game with as little time as possible.

          McDermott either didn't count on or wasn't even willing to countenance the possibility that the drive would end without points. After the two consecutive completions, Bass' 44-yarder was pulled wide by swirling winds. If McDermott knew his kicker was going to miss, I'm sure he would have played faster, but I don't fault the Bills for trying to end regulation on that drive with the ball in Allen's hands.

          It turned out that they gave the ball back to the Chiefs with 1:43 to go and two timeouts, at which point Isiah Pacheco ran through them for a first down to end the season. Like Allen's attempt to hit Shakir, I don't really fault McDermott, but he will likely look back and wonder what could have been if he had been more aggressive in trying to score.

          The situation: Fourth-and-5, Bills ball on their own 32-yard line, 12:57 left in the fourth quarter

          The play: The Bills fail on a fake punt and give the ball to the Chiefs, who hand it right back with a fumble through the end zone for a touchback.

          This was another wild sequence. Let's start with the fake. Originally, I wanted to give the Bills the benefit of the doubt for the fake punt and assumed that it was a call made on the field. Dave Toub's normally solid special teams unit only sent 10 players out to field this punt from Sam Martin. With Richie James deep and two players split out wide on Siran Neal, the Chiefs were at an even bigger disadvantage. They had six men in the box against seven Bills blockers and the upback in Damar Hamlin. With the Chiefs not having a single defensive lineman on the field, having seven blockers against six defenders is a huge opportunity.

          That made sense to me, but when I woke up this morning, I found out McDermott had called the fake punt from the sideline before the Chiefs had even sent 10 men onto the field! That's a bad decision, even if it was given a better chance of succeeding by the mistake from Kansas City. If the Bills knew they were going to go for it on fourth down regardless of whether they were facing 10 men or 11, they should have kept the offense on the field and had Josh Allen run a play as opposed to the fake punt.

          In terms of what actually happened on the field, though, the Chiefs just out-executed the Bills.

          The decision looked it might cost the Bills the game until the Chiefs bailed them out with yet another mistake by a wide receiver. After Pacheco got the ball to the 3-yard line, coach Andy Reid dialed up a tap pass to Mecole Hardman. The receiver made it to the edge and reached out with the football toward the end zone, but on the way down, the ball was knocked out of his hands by Jordan Poyer and went through the sideline for a touchback and change of possession.

          The Chiefs probably won't have 10 men on the field for a punt the rest of the way. Given their reticence to use Mahomes on sneaks, though, it seems likely Reid will go back to a jet sweep or some sort of horizontal motion with one of his many wide receivers to try to score in short yardage. That isn't always a problem; we did see the Chiefs score two touchdowns on fake motion in Super Bowl LVII. But this team has been killed by mental mistakes from its wideouts all season, and Hardman's play was another example of the Chiefs nearly losing a game because of one. Kadarius Toney likely cost them wins over the Bills and Lions with gaffes, which is why this game was in Buffalo and not Kansas City. On Sunday, the Chiefs were lucky it didn't cost them another victory.

          In general, Kansas City's struggles in the red zone have been worrisome. After going 2-for-6 in the red zone against the Dolphins last weekend, it was 2-for-4 on Sunday. That's only a 10-possession sample, but the Chiefs were 17th in red zone conversion rate during the regular season. When they face the league's toughest defense and third-best red zone defense next week in Baltimore, I wouldn't want to count on settling for field goals.

          The situation: First-and-goal, Chiefs ball on the Bills' 3-yard line, 11:55 to go in the third quarter

          The play: Travis Kelce scores his second touchdown of the game on a screen pass.

          One of the plays that did work in the red zone was a screen to Kelce. Here, the Chiefs ran a quick play fake to Clyde Edwards-Helaire before Mahomes threw back to the other side of the field, where Kelce had a convoy of blockers. He cut outside and fought through an A.J. Klein tackle attempt for the touchdown. Klein, who played zero defensive snaps during the regular season before being forced into 40-plus in each of Buffalo's two playoff games because of injuries, was overmatched against the future Hall of Fame tight end throughout the game.

          What stands out here is less the play and more the formation. The Chiefs had three tight ends on the field, with Kelce, Noah Gray and Blake Bell all lined up next to one another. While it's not uncommon for a team to use three tight ends in a goal-line jumbo package, they have gone to 13 personnel (one running back, tight end) all over the place during the postseason. After using that grouping just over 7% of the time during the regular season, Reid has sent out 13 personnel on nearly 24% of the offensive snaps during the playoffs.

          It has been working, as 48% of the Chiefs' plays out of 13 personnel have been successful. That has been a significant upgrade on their base 11 personnel (40%) and 12 personnel (35%) packages. On Sunday, Kansas City ran the ball eight times out of 13 personnel for 80 yards. Mahomes was 2-of-3 passing for 15 yards, picking up the touchdown to Kelce and a 12-yard completion to Gray.

          Facing a team already short on linebackers (which got shorter during the game), it made sense for the Chiefs to go bigger and dare the Bills to match up. Next week, facing a Baltimore defense that has a relatively healthy front seven and a starring set of linebackers in Roquan Smith and Patrick Queen, we'll see if Reid sticks with the same philosophy.

          Lions 31, Buccaneers 23

          The situation: Second-and-goal, Lions ball at the Buccaneers' 3-yard line, 9:13 to go in the first quarter

          The play: Jamel Dean drops a gift-wrapped interception from Jared Goff.

          You often hear that the NBA can be a make-or-miss league. The NFL can be a catch it-or-drop-it league. The Lions brought in their opportunities on two interceptions, including the game-sealing pick by Derrick Barnes late in the fourth quarter. The Bucs dropped their best shot at one in the end zone, when the Lions ran a variant of mesh and Goff left his throw too close to the trailing defender. Dean got two uncontested hands on the ball and should have had an easy pick, but he wasn't able to bring it in.

          The Lions kicked a field goal two plays later. This was the only red zone failure of the day by either team, but the Lions were understandably happy to end up with three when they probably should have had zero. Goff's pass was off his back foot, thrown as pressure began to bear down around left tackle and up the middle. He was nearly perfect for stretches of this game, but this early play showed it's sometimes better to be lucky than good.

          The situation: Third-and-4, Lions ball at the Buccaneers' 44-yard line, 15:00 to go in the second quarter

          The play: Goff beats pressure and hits Sam LaPorta for 14 yards.

          Every quarterback gets worse when under pressure, but no quarterback is more affected by pressure than Goff. He led the league in QBR while unpressured this season, but he ranked 27th when opposing pass rushes got after him. Facing Todd Bowles and a Bucs defense that blitzes at one of the highest rates in football, his ability to handle pressure was going to help define how this game went.

          Bowles loves to blitz, but he also loves some of the same sim pressures Mike Macdonald uses in Baltimore. Here, the Bucs showed a four-man front against an empty, condensed offensive formation. Bowles then sent both of his slot defenders on blitzes and dropped defensive tackles Calijah Kancey and Vita Vea into coverage as hole defenders. Star safety Antoine Winfield Jr. came roaring off the edge unblocked. Just before he got home, Goff fired a perfect pass to LaPorta vs. Carlton Davis for a first down.

          Against pressure, Goff finished 6-of-10 for 52 yards with a 46.5 QBR. That's not incredible, but it's a lot better than the 10.0 QBR he had under pressure during the regular season. And one week after going 22-of-22 for 272 yards and a touchdown without pressure against the Rams, he went 24-of-35 for 235 yards with two scores without pressure Sunday. If Goff can do a passable job against pressure, it's going to be hard to stop the Lions.

          The situation: Third-and-4, Buccaneers ball at the Lions' 38-yard line, 11:31 to go in the third quarter

          The play: Aidan Hutchinson sacks Baker Mayfield.

          The Detroit pass rush is a one-man show, which made this play even more perplexing. With the Bucs on the edge of field goal range, Mayfield & Co. came out in an empty formation, with five receivers split out across the formation. Lions defensive coordinator Aaron Glenn responded by showing six men at the line of scrimmage, suggesting they were going to play Cover 0 with no safety help across the board. Six is more than five, which meant Mayfield was going to be "hot" off one side of the formation if the Lions brought more rushers to that side than Tampa Bay could block and needed to get rid of the football if all six defenders came.

          Mayfield could have slid his protection either way to try to choose which player to block on the edge. The natural decision would seem to be sliding it toward Hutchinson, who is Detroit's only pass-rusher of note. Instead, the Bucs slid their protection the other way, leaving right tackle Luke Goedeke to try to account for both Jack Campbell and Hutchinson. With Campbell having a quicker path to the quarterback as the interior player, Goedeke would have to first work to Campbell; if he didn't come, Goedeke would then have a chance to try to block Hutchinson.

          Glenn ended up dropping two defenders off the rush and sent only four, but the look and the decision not to slide the protection toward Hutchinson blew up the play. When Campbell didn't blitz, Goedeke wasn't able to work his way over to Hutchinson quickly enough, leaving the star edge rusher with a free path toward Mayfield. When Mayfield double-clutched, Hutchinson was on him for a sack.

          The play knocked the Bucs out of field goal range, forcing them to punt on fourth-and-long inside Lions territory. Along with the dropped interception by Dean, these two plays amounted to a six-point swing that made the endgame much more difficult for the Buccaneers.

          The situation: Third-and-10, Buccaneers ball at the Lions' 12-yard line, 0:16 left to go in the third quarter

          The play: A perfectly timed screen produces a walk-in touchdown for Rachaad White.

          The Buccaneers left some plays on the table with a pair of Mike Evans drops, but Mayfield and coordinator Dave Canales were both very good Sunday. Mayfield had more impressive throws at the end of the first half and on the drive to make it a one-score game in the fourth quarter, but as I look at the upcoming matchup between the 49ers and Lions, I keep coming back to this screen that produced a 12-yard score for White.

          One play after the Lions neglected to challenge a Mayfield throwaway in which it looked like the quarterback might have hit the ground before getting rid of the football, Glenn sent a five-man sim pressure, adding C.J. Gardner-Johnson on a rush up the A-gap while dropping both defensive ends into coverage. With his two top wideouts to the left of the formation, Canales had the perfect call. He sent a screen in the other direction to White, who had struggled in pass protection earlier in the contest. Mayfield held onto the football just long enough to lure the rush, and with Goedeke sealing Hutchinson in the flat, White walked in untouched for a game-tying score.

          It was a great call at the right time, but it also makes me think about how the Lions will try to attack the 49ers next week. Glenn was able to repeatedly create pressure with blitzes out of the slot and by adding extra men on the rush, relying on the Buccaneers to make mistakes in pass protection. If those rushes don't get home, the 49ers have the sort of playmakers who can turn a sliver of open space into an 80-yard score. And if Glenn doesn't blitz, it's going to take a mammoth game from Hutchinson to break down Brock Purdy and the passing attack.

          Glenn will need to strike a balance and have perfect timing with his pressures to win in San Francisco; this play was an example of what can happen when the blitz doesn't get home.

          The situation: Third-and-15, Lions ball at their own 44-yard line, 9:06 to go in the fourth quarter

          The play: A deep curl from Amon-Ra St. Brown produces a crucial 16-yard completion.

          For all the dynamism and brilliant window dressing in offensive coordinator Ben Johnson's scheme, there's one place the Lions are going to go when they absolutely need a big play. Last week, when they needed to convert a second-and-9 to run down the clock late in the fourth quarter, they spread the Rams out and threw a curl to St. Brown. He caught it to end L.A.'s season.

          This week, it was a critical third-and-15. After a Lavonte David sack, the Lions were in third-and-long and running the risk of punting the ball away to the Bucs in a one-score game. Needing a big play, guess what they did? They kept seven in for pass protection to help block up a potential blitz. The blitz never came, but Johnson isolated St. Brown against nickel cornerback Zyon McCollum, who was playing outside because of an injury to Dean. St. Brown ran an 18-yard comeback, and the ball was in the air before he even turned around. Goff trusts his top receiver, and St. Brown rewarded him with a catch to move the chains.

          Four plays later, the Lions were in the end zone on another pass to St. Brown, this time a slot fade over McCollum with a pick. St. Brown isn't a conventional No. 1 receiver, but his physicality and ability to create little pockets of space in tight windows are what the Lions rely on when they're not in position to manufacture a big play with play-action. Facing a San Francisco team that rarely has Charvarius Ward switch sides, expect St. Brown to line up against Ambry Thomas in key situations in the NFC Championship Game. And if Detroit needs a big play, don't be surprised when it goes to its top wideout.

          49ers 24, Packers 21

          The situation: First-and-15, 49ers ball at their own 35-yard line, 5:40 to go in the first quarter

          The play: Darnell Savage drops a gift-wrapped interception from Brock Purdy.

          The formula the Packers rode to blow out the Cowboys in the wild-card round and the Ravens used to dominate the 49ers on Christmas isn't complicated. Get an early lead on offense, force a turnover, make a dynamic opponent one-dimensional and reap the results. This formula works on anyone, but given how dominant Purdy has been playing from ahead this season, the best path forward for the Packers had to be getting up by multiple scores early.

          They nearly got there. First, on the opening drive, a great play by Charvarius Ward tipped away a post that should have been a touchdown pass to Romeo Doubs, with the Green Bay receiver not doing enough to shield the cornerback away from the football. What could have been a 7-0 lead instead went down as a field goal.

          On the first drive of the game for the 49ers, Purdy nearly added to the total. Coach Kyle Shanahan used motion to dictate outside leverage for Brandon Aiyuk's in-breaking route, and with three receivers operating to the other side of the field, Purdy appeared to expect Savage to work toward the strong side of the offense. Instead, Savage stayed in the middle of the field and jumped a throw that was probably a beat or two late from Purdy. The 49ers are probably not the team you want chasing you down on an interception return, but Savage likely scores if he catches this pick in stride. Instead of 3-0, the Packers could have been up 14-0 within the game's first 10 minutes.

          Savage, unfortunately for the Packers, proceeded to be conspicuous in some of the best moments of the game. He was overmatched in coverage against George Kittle on the tight end's 32-yard touchdown in the second quarter. When Christian McCaffrey cut upfield in the third quarter, he ran right past a Savage tackle attempt in the hole and to the end zone for a 39-yard touchdown. Savage had a nice open-field tackle of McCaffrey later in the game, but he might have swung a close game away from Green Bay. With his fifth-year option now complete, the 2019 first-round pick might have played his final game with the Packers.

          The situation: Fourth-and-1, Packers ball at the 49ers' 14-yard line, 14:40 to go in the second quarter

          The play: A Jordan Love tush push fails.

          With the score still 3-0, the Packers drove deep into 49ers territory on their second drive after a long catch-and-run by Doubs. After Aaron Jones was stopped on a third-and-1 by an excellent stuff from the combo of Sebastian Joseph-Day and Dre Greenlaw, the Packers hurried up on fourth down and ran Love on a tush push. The television angles made it look like Love had produced a first down, but the refs didn't give the young quarterback a generous spot, and with the call too close to challenge with any confidence this early in the game, the 49ers took over on downs.

          Yes, coach Matt LaFleur was right to go for it. NFL Next Gen Stats suggests the decision to try to convert was worth 5.5 points of win expectancy, which is an enormous swing for these sorts of calls in the first quarter. Coming away with three points would have been great, but given that Anders Carlson would later miss a 41-yard field goal and the Fox crew reported LaFleur saying he "prays" when Carlson goes onto the field to attempt a kick, it's safe to say a 32-yarder in the rain wouldn't have been a guarantee, either.

          In the big picture, the Packers needed touchdowns on their three early trips inside the red zone and came away with six points on two field goals. Teams that dominate early in games and fail to come away with touchdowns on multiple trips into the red zone often end up getting upset, with the Packers' loss to the Seahawks and the Saints' loss to the Rams in past NFC Championship Games as notable examples. Last week, the Packers went 4-for-4 in the red zone against the Cowboys and shut the door on Dallas. This week, Love & Co. left the door ajar for the 49ers, and they eventually kicked it in.

          The situation: Second-and-5, 49ers ball at the Packers' 46-yard line, 1:19 to go in the second quarter

          The play: McCaffrey runs for 3 yards, and the 49ers power down.

          Shanahan is one of the NFL's best coaches. He's likely the most creative offensive mind in the game. Opposing defensive coordinators go sleepless at night, worrying he's going to break their defenses. He probably just got the best coach in Seahawks history fired because the 49ers have torched Pete Carroll's defenses for half a decade now.

          But he has a game management problem, and it has reared its head before. I wrote about it in my recap of the 49ers-Chiefs Super Bowl, when Shanahan put the brakes on the offense at the end of the first half, then suddenly tried to speed up, failing to score in the process. He said afterward he was happy to be 10-10 at halftime, but it ignored the reality of the team he was facing. The Chiefs struggled most of that game, but in the fourth quarter, they took advantage of a tiring 49ers pass rush and marched down the field to produce a comeback victory. (Consider that the Eagles, huge underdogs in a prior Super Bowl, went on a drive at the end of the first half and even attempted a fourth-and-1 pass to Nick Foles when they could have gone into halftime with a 15-12 lead. In the long run, they needed the points from the Philly Special to win.)

          Here, again in the first half, Shanahan capped his team's success out of fear that he might create an opportunity for the opposing team. With the ball on Green Bay's side of the field and all three of his timeouts, Shanahan called for a McCaffrey run to set up third down. He then let the play clock wind down to one second before calling a timeout, even though the 49ers could have easily called in a play during that window, run it at the end of the clock and called a timeout.

          Instead, Purdy hit Jauan Jennings for a first down, which triggered another timeout. Purdy threw a pass over the middle of the field and then spiked the ball, setting up a third-and-2 throw out of bounds. The 49ers never even used their third timeout, and their 48-yard field goal in the rain was blocked to end the half.

          Yes, Shanahan prevented the Packers from getting an opportunity to kick a field goal. In the process, though, he eliminated any realistic hope of his team marching down the field to score a touchdown at the end of the half. Sporting the league's most dangerous set of playmakers -- even without Deebo Samuel -- against a Green Bay defense that hasn't been good most of the season, Shanahan seemed to lose faith in his offense and played for a long field goal in subpar kicking conditions. By making such poor use of his timeouts, he forced his players to rush to the line and waste a snap on a spike.

          I wouldn't pay much attention to this if it were a one-time thing, but Shanahan repeatedly has been conservative in these situations and has been hesitant to trust his offense. I thought that might be a product of having Jimmy Garoppolo under center, but it also seems to be the case with Purdy. It's something we also hear about with coach Sean McVay, who brought up "the flow of the game" in dismissing what analytics suggested about the Rams' decision to punt late in their loss to the Lions. (That would qualify as the base rate fallacy.) In past postseasons, I've seen Shanahan play conservatively in early rounds and get away with it, only for those problems to come back in season-ending losses. I'm hoping that doesn't happen again.

          The situation: Third-and-15, Packers ball at their own 40-yard line, 9:40 to go in the third quarter

          The play: Ambry Thomas commits a 41-yard defensive pass interference penalty.

          Third-and-15 should be a dream down for the 49ers, who just want to let their pass-rushers pin their ears back and get after the quarterback. (Outside of Javon Hargrave, who set up one of those red zone failures with a great rush, this was a quiet game for that pass rush.) It shouldn't be a great spot for the Packers, who don't get to incorporate play-action and don't have that star receiver who can get open against double coverage.

          Here, though, it produced a huge play for Green Bay. The 49ers dropped most of their coverage to the sticks, but the Packers ran two checkdown routes underneath and had their three other receivers run well past the sticks. Bo Melton ran a go route past Thomas, and while Love's pass was (perhaps deliberately) underthrown, Thomas grabbed Melton and dragged him down while attempting to get back in phase, producing a field-shifting pass interference penalty. The Packers scored a touchdown on the next play.

          Thomas had a second pass interference penalty on the opening drive of the game on a third-and-6. On the final drive of the game, with Thomas playing off in coverage -- perhaps to avoid another one of those plays where somebody blows by him -- the Packers hit their two completions in front of him on the right side of the defense. As the nickel back for the 49ers, he isn't an every-down player, but he could be if they play the Chiefs in the Super Bowl. Expect teams to challenge Thomas downfield if the 49ers get there.

          The situation: Kickoff from the 49ers to the Packers, 7:47 to go in the third quarter

          The play: The Packers pull off the perfect fumble recovery.

          After the 49ers scored to take a 14-13 lead, All-Pro returner Keisean Nixon fielded a kick at the goal line and got going. He broke outside and went 73 yards down the sideline before fumbling. With the ball bouncing on the turf, Packers linebacker Eric Wilson chased down the loose ball from behind and made what I can only describe as one of the most aesthetically pleasing fumble recoveries I've ever seen.

          With five 49ers surrounding him, he dove on the football and immediately took the air out of it, smothering it in his grasp while making a sliding recovery. He also managed to hold onto the ball with several 49ers attempting to grab it away at the bottom of the pile before his Green Bay teammates could jump on and help out.

          The Packers scored a touchdown four plays later and added a 2-point conversion, so Wilson's recovery saved eight points. Green Bay also recovered the other fumble in this game on the prior drive when Jones failed to bring in a pitch from Love on a play inside Packers territory; that drive also produced a touchdown pass to Melton on a fake screen pass. Those two fumble recoveries played a huge role before Love's two interceptions in the fourth quarter swung the game back toward the 49ers.

          The situation: Third-and-5, 49ers ball at their own 47-yard line, 3:38 to go in the fourth quarter

          The play: A 9-yard completion to Aiyuk moves the chains.

          This wasn't Purdy's best game by any stretch of the imagination. Losing Samuel (left shoulder), a key part of the game plan in years past against the Packers, didn't help. (The decision to hand the ball off to Jennings to start the third quarter because he was playing Samuel's role in the lineup will not be part of Shanahan's Hall of Fame induction one day.) Purdy was lucky to get away with at least one would-be interception, missed several open receivers, threw balls all over the place and posted a 27.8% off-target pass rate, his second-worst mark of the season.

          Aiyuk and Kittle both had drops, with Kittle's coming on the play before this one on what should have been an easy first down. With the 49ers trailing by four points and the clock winding down, a punt would have been disastrous. Shanahan did not want to see his defense facing a four-minute drill against the Packers with the season on the line.

          Purdy's best throw Saturday was the touchdown pass to Kittle, a perfect throw on the run to an open receiver. This one might have been more difficult, although it also required an excellent catch. Aiyuk beat Nixon at the snap and broke inside on a slant, and while Nixon did a good job of recovering, Purdy put the ball in a spot where only his receiver could bring it in. Aiyuk made a diving, sliding catch and hung onto the football, giving the 49ers a sorely needed first down.

          From that point on, the 49ers marched down the field and scored a touchdown in six plays. As much as Purdy struggled, he was excellent on the final drive, going 6-of-7 for 47 yards while converting a third-and-1 sneak and adding a 9-yard scramble in the red zone. If you're a Purdy skeptic, he missed throws often enough for you to feel validated about your concerns. And if you're a Purdy believer, well, what he did on the final drive was enough for you to feel like you're right, too.

          Ravens 34, Texans 10

          The situation: Second-and-10, Ravens ball at the Texans' 15-yard line, 12:10 to go in the third quarter

          The play: Lamar Jackson rushes for a 15-yard touchdown.

          Until the Ravens finally wore down the Texans late with their running game and started to create big holes at the line of scrimmage for their backs, they spent most of this game struggling on offense. During a frustrating first half, Jackson racked up 48 yards on four scrambles, but the rest of the offense managed only 70 net yards across 27 plays. Linebacker Christian Harris looked like he had morphed into some combination of Fred Warner and a monster truck. Houston coach DeMeco Ryans seemed to be a step ahead of coordinator Todd Monken and the Ravens' offense. You could almost hear and see the sense of dread among the fans in Baltimore: Was this going to be another disappointing postseason loss?

          The Ravens wrestled back the game on the first drive of the third quarter, taking the lead and scoring the first of 24 unanswered points in the second half. Again, they relied on Jackson's legs and decision-making. Monken dialed up an RPO with two quick outs, allowing Jackson to throw the ball if he had a great look. If not, the call was for Jackson to run a lead draw with center Tyler Linderbaum and running back Gus Edwards slipping out to take on defenders. By the time anyone touched Jackson, he had already built up enough of a head of steam to fall into the end zone.

          This play neatly encapsulates why it's so hard to stop the Ravens. Jackson didn't have his best game by any stretch of the imagination. He nearly threw an interception on the play before this one. His longest completion of the day, a 21-yarder to Rashod Bateman, should have been an even bigger gain, but Jackson's throw was low and forced Bateman to go down to catch the pass. Jackson has and will have better games as a passer than what he did Saturday.

          Jackson's ability as a runner, though, dictates defenses and creates a floor for the Ravens' offense that makes them hard to beat. The first touchdown of the drive started with a 23-yard scramble by him and ended with a conversion on third-and-5 in the red zone to set up a passing touchdown to Nelson Agholor. A quarterback sweep on the drive I just mentioned set up a touchdown pass to Isaiah Likely. Jackson converted fourth-and-1 on a keeper for 14 yards and a first down, then ran the same concept with Ronnie Stanley leading the way for an 8-yard score late in the fourth quarter.

          Jackson's first three scrambles of the game all came against four-man rushes, which led Ryans to morph into Wink Martindale. The Texans blitzed Jackson on 69% of his dropbacks, the sixth-highest rate for any team all season. It's the only game in the top 15 that didn't include the Giants, Vikings or Buccaneers, the NFL's three most blitz-heavy teams. The Texans blitzed about 22% of the time during the regular season, the league's 23rd-highest rate.

          The Texans had some success with those blitzes, but Monken and Jackson found solutions as the game wore on. Jackson broke through with runs to the outside and RPOs. With the Texans using more man coverage behind those blitzes, the Ravens dialed up more pick plays and throws into the flat. Eventually, with their main gambit foiled, a gassed Texans defense wasn't able to sustain their style of play, and the Ravens broke the game open late on the ground.

          The situation: First-and-10, Texans ball at the Ravens' 39-yard line, 8:06 to go in the third quarter

          The play: A trick play to set up a screen to Xavier Hutchinson loses 5 yards.

          Having scored three points while racking up six first downs across their first five drives, the Texans and offensive coordinator Bobby Slowik were realistic about what needed to happen to keep up with the Ravens. Facing an aggressive, creative set of sim pressures that both stressed C.J. Stroud and kept the Texans from hitting big plays over the top, Slowik had a trick play set up to try to create a much-needed explosive for the Texans. After a 16-yard Devin Singletary run got the Texans over midfield, Slowik dialed it up.

          Frankly, it looked ugly. Stroud handed the ball on a jet sweep to Hutchinson, who pitched it to John Metchie III on an end-around. Just before he was hit, Metchie pitched it back to Stroud, who barely got his fingers on the laces before tossing it out into the flat to Hutchinson. The wide receiver was immediately set upon by Ravens safety Geno Stone, who grabbed Hutchinson around the ankle and took him down for a loss of five yards.

          It looked ugly because any trick play that isn't executed well looks ugly. Any coach will tell you their perfectly drawn up play would have been a touchdown if the players had just executed it the way it looked on paper, but in this case, the Texans actually had it set up for a touchdown. They had three offensive linemen out in the flat in front of Hutchinson. If George Fant or either of his brethren had blocked Stone, the Texans were going to have two blockers and one defender between Hutchinson and the end zone. This actually should have been a score.

          Credit to Stone, who made a play that probably saved a touchdown. Stroud's hurried throw took Hutchinson a couple of steps toward the sideline, which took the wide receiver off his mark for the screen and made the block more difficult for Fant, who couldn't see where the ball was going. What looked like a mess of a trick play from behind the line of scrimmage would have been a touchdown with slightly better execution. The Texans would run a total of 12 more offensive plays all game and rack up 27 net yards. Their offense had been and would continue to be stifled over the remainder of the game. The trick play was a risk worth taking.

          The situation: Fourth-and-6, Texans ball at their own 33-yard line, 5:41 to go in the fourth quarter

          The play: Arthur Maulet forces an incomplete pass from Stroud.

          By day, Maulet is a mild-mannered, relatively anonymous cornerback who made the Ravens' roster for his special-teams ability. Put him near the line of scrimmage in a passing situation, though, and he turns into the most devastating pass-rusher in league history. Defensive coordinator Mike Macdonald has turned the journeyman playing for his fifth team in seven seasons into a guy every quarterback has to be worried about screaming off the edge.

          Maulet rushed Stroud three times Sunday. He pressured Stroud on all three of those dropbacks. He was unblocked on all three plays and basically ended three drives. The first pressure produced an intentional grounding, knocking the Texans out of field goal range and leading to a punt. The second came on a third-and-5 in the fourth quarter, producing a second punt. This third came on fourth down and closed the door on the Texans' season.

          All of these plays were some form of a simulated pressure, which has become Macdonald's hallmark since joining the Ravens. Other coaches run them, but Macdonald has a wider variety and relies on them more often than any other defensive coordinator I've seen. The idea is to overload one side or element of a pass protection by bringing more defenders than an offense can block while unexpectedly dropping other defenders into coverage, thereby "simulating" a blitz while rushing only four or five defenders.

          On the fourth-down play, the Ravens lined up six men on the line of scrimmage and dropped the three middle defenders (including two defensive tackles) into coverage; despite actually sending only three players after the quarterback, Maulet rushed untouched toward Stroud to blow up the play.

          With Martindale as their defensive coordinator from 2018 to 2021, the Ravens blitzed at one of the league's highest rates, but they gave up too many big plays and yards after catch on the back end when those blitzes didn't get home. Macdonald blitzes on 19.7% of dropbacks, which is the fifth-lowest rate, but he uses those sim pressures to create unblocked rushers and pass protection problems without leaving his defense vulnerable behind. After lighting up the Browns with big plays last weekend, Stroud was 3-of-8 on deep passes and didn't have a single gain of 30-plus yards.