How the Nuggets and Nikola Jokic have supercharged their average defense -- and just in time

If the Denver Nuggets are overlooked as a championship favorite relative to the typical No. 1 seed, it's because they ranked 15th in points allowed per possession. Even amid an unprecedented scoring boom, it's rare for teams with an average or worse defense to win the title.

The Nuggets ranked 15th last season, 11th two seasons ago, and 16th in 2019-20 -- the pandemic-interrupted season in which Denver won two seven-game series to advance to the conference finals. (This indeed happened, despite every postseason broadcast of the Nuggets featuring some reference to the pressure on Nikola Jokic to finally lead Denver deep into the playoffs.)

This is who the Nuggets are: an average defensive team. They have an all-world offense built around an all-galactic superstar, and a few teams with that profile -- incredible offense, blah defense -- have advanced to the promised land. But Denver's defense has backslid in each of the past four postseasons. The regular-season trend of Denver being stingier on defense with Jokic on the floor has not held up in the past three of those postseasons.

That's not entirely surprising. Every playoff opponent is good, and Jokic in the postseason plays more minutes against the best opposing lineups. In the past two playoffs, the Nuggets have missed critical players -- including Jamal Murray in both postseasons, and Michael Porter Jr. last season. Most of those missing players leaned offense, but part of whatever steadiness Denver has achieved on defense is linked to its scoring like gangbusters -- and setting its half-court defense.

Jokic brings some pluses on defense -- he is a transformative rebounder -- but he has real flaws. He is not a shot-blocker. Opponents shot 68.5% at the basket when Jokic was the closest defender, the second-highest (i.e., second-worst) mark among all players who challenged at least four such shots per game, according to NBA.com. He's not quick enough to switch onto most primary or secondary ball handlers.

Those two weaknesses place pretty strict limits on Denver's schematic flexibility. In the regular season, that isn't a huge deal. Teams mostly stick to their core schemes from game to game. If one opponent presents some issues, well, the next night things might be better.

The playoffs are totally different. You face the same team over and over. To win it all, you have to beat four teams four times apiece. Every opponent brings its own challenges. Even the best teams have to be at least somewhat nimble. One scheme might not work for all four series.

Denver during the Jokic/Michael Malone era has not been very nimble. It has been hard to calculate the cost of that rigidity, because the Nuggets were drawing dead -- due to injury -- in each of the past two postseasons.

That began to change in the regular season with tweaks against specific opponents, and has accelerated in Denver's first two wins in this series over the Minnesota Timberwolves. It's working so far; the Wolves have scored a minuscule 103.2 points per 100 possessions in two games despite shooting decently (37%) on 3s.

Against the pick-and-roll, Jokic has historically preferred an in-between style of coverage in which he tries to corral ball handlers at the level of the screen -- usually high on the floor, around the 3-point arc. That makes sense. Switching is a no-go for him. Dropping back -- the style preferred by lots of centers -- opens a long runway for ball handlers to rev up. That works for behemoths with speed, leaping ability, and exquisite timing. Leap headlong into Joel Embiid, and he'll meet you at the summit. A No. 1 option zooming at Jokic has a good shot at getting by him or finishing around him.

Jokic's go-to style doesn't quite amount to trapping opposing ball handlers, but it's close; the Nuggets put two on the ball, meaning the other three defenders have to temporarily defend four players.

Two years ago in the conference semifinals, a Phoenix Suns team with four shooters around Deandre Ayton tore that scheme to shreds. Over and over, Chris Paul and Devin Booker baited Jokic toward the 3-point arc and pinged the ball around before the Nuggets' defense could find its equilibrium again. The Suns' core lineups had no weak shooters -- no one Denver could ignore. The Nuggets could not keep up with the ball, or cover so much space.

The Nuggets in the offseason acquired two rugged, smart perimeter defenders in Bruce Brown and Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. Part of the calculus, sources said then, was unlocking access to more schematic variety: stock the roster with guards who get over screens untouched, and perhaps Jokic might feel more comfortable hanging closer to the paint -- in turn allowing Denver's other three defenders to stick to shooters. A runway in front of you doesn't offer the same freedom of movement if your defender is right on your hip.

Denver is flashing different looks at the Wolves -- keeping Minnesota off balance. The Nuggets are dropping Jokic back on more sideline pick-and-rolls from both Anthony Edwards and Mike Conley:

Jokic waits for Edwards below the foul line. Murray trails him. The other three Denver defenders are planted outside the paint. The goal is to play the pick-and-roll 2-on-2: Murray and Jokic alone against Edwards and Rudy Gobert.

The Nuggets have extended this conservative approach to a lot of Conley's middle pick-and-rolls:

That risks some floaters from Conley and his screeners (Kyle Anderson here), but Denver is willing to live with contested midrange 2s if it means shutting off catch-and-shoot 3s from Minnesota's best shooters -- and staying out of rotation. The Nuggets are betting Conley is not explosive enough to punish this strategy by driving into Jokic.

They are fearful of laying back this way on Edwards' pick-and-rolls in the middle of the floor -- with good reason:

Give Edwards an open road toward Jokic, and he's going to inflict pain. (Edwards also hit several pull-up 2s over this coverage in Game 2.)

At times on those plays, the Nuggets revert to their classic scheme -- with Jokic meeting Edwards at the point of attack. But they are also exploiting some of Minnesota's weaker shooting lineups by dropping Jokic back and sending help inside to deter those Edwards rampages:

Jokic stands inside the foul line as Edwards and his screener (Gobert) converge. Alone, that would be dicey. But Jokic isn't alone. Murray abandons Jaylen Nowell in the left corner and bumps Gobert -- threatening any pass there from Edwards. The Nuggets are not so much ignoring Nowell -- a decent shooter -- as much as Anderson, who is above Nowell on the wing. They don't care about Anderson shooting 3s. Caldwell-Pope is likely a half-second late rotating from Anderson to Nowell, and Nowell beats him off the bounce to draw a foul. The Wolves win that battle, but it's hard work requiring multiple efforts for uncertain payoffs -- often in the form of off-the-bounce floaters against the shot clock.

Here's Christian Braun providing the same support -- again off Anderson -- as Jokic drops back to contain a Conley-Gobert pick-and-roll:

For most teams, the whole point of a dropback scheme is avoiding exactly this sort of rotation -- a third defender abandoning his guy at the arc to crash inside. But the Nuggets are combining two sometimes disparate schemes whenever the Wolves have one of Anderson or Nickeil Alexander-Walker on the floor.

The help off those players is early and automatic when Jokic ventures higher on the floor:

In that more aggressive scheme, the Nuggets appear to be fine daring Gobert to beat them as a playmaker in the open floor.

The Wolves have a bunch of potential counters. One is starting Taurean Prince over Alexander-Walker again, and maybe bumping up his minutes; Prince hit 38% from deep this season, and he drilled three 3s in Game 2. But there are only so many minutes to go around; Anderson and Gobert are two of Minnesota's five best players, and they will need to play a lot -- and a lot together -- in this series with Jaden McDaniels out. (McDaniels shot 40% on 3s this season; the Wolves really miss him now.)

Minnesota could set screens higher on the floor, giving its ball handlers more space to operate when Jokic drops back -- or forcing Denver to rotate over longer distances if the Nuggets try to contain the pick-and-roll above the arc. On pick-and-rolls where Jokic is most likely to semi-blitz -- i.e., Edwards in the middle of the floor -- they might have Jokic's man set two or three consecutive screens, flipping the angle every time. Jokic can manage one hard slide, but going back and forth can get him out of sorts.

Minnesota should probably have its off-ball wings move more -- switching places, lifting up from the wing to the top of the arc, cutting randomly -- to keep Denver guessing. If Denver continues ignoring Anderson and Alexander-Walker outside, the Wolves could have them set flare screens for better shooters instead of chilling at the arc.

(Minnesota has found openings when it runs its guards and wings off pindowns away from the ball -- including as a vehicle to catapult them into handoffs. The Nuggets have been a bit hazy tracking that motion. The Wolves should probably do it more.)

The Wolves could tilt more of their pick-and-roll game away from Gobert and toward Towns -- a fearsome pick-and-pop shooter. Towns has 21 points and seven fouls combined in two games, continuing what is officially an alarming habit of disappearing from playoff games.

That's (slightly) easier said than done. If Towns is screening, that means Gobert is doing something else -- perhaps hanging in the dunker spot, clogging the paint. (Using them both to set staggered screens and playing from there is always good.) If Towns rumbles into the paint -- if that's what Denver concedes -- he's rolling into traffic. Towns can make plays in tight spaces, but the Nuggets will have a say.

Denver is also switching a lot of Towns' screening actions, on and off the ball, even if it means guards and wings (even Murray!) are stuck on him. Towns has historically looked a little more at ease facing up centers on the block than backing down smaller players. He bulldozes into offensive fouls. The Nuggets have also mixed up the timing of their help on those matchups, and Towns can be skittish and turnover prone when he doesn't know what's coming.

The Wolves also ignore some Towns mismatches. There were multiple instances in Game 2 when Murray switched onto Towns, and the Wolves' offense carried on seemingly oblivious to Towns having a major size mismatch. That's partly on Towns, too, for drifting aimlessly along the arc instead of demanding the ball. It's harder to post up on one block when Gobert might be on the other, but both Towns and the Wolves are bypassing chances to get Towns involved. Could they set more cross screens in the paint to spring him on post-ups?

All of this should be cleaner when Gobert rests and Towns shifts to center; Jokic is not equipped to chase Towns on pick-and-pops. But the Nuggets in those minutes have been stashing Jokic on Anderson, and guarding Towns with Jeff Green or Aaron Gordon. Can the Wolves' defense hold up if Towns plays without both Anderson and Gobert? This is another place where the McDaniels void looms.