<
>

Trevor Lawrence, Zach Wilson, Justin Fields and Mac Jones have been a disaster: Explaining the NFL rookie QBs' early-season issues

It hasn't been an explosive start to the season for the NFL's rookie quarterbacks. The five first-rounders from April's draft have combined to go 1-9 as starters so far, with their only win coming when one of the rookies (Mac Jones) beat another (Zach Wilson). On 378 pass attempts, they've completed 57.4% of them, averaged 5.8 yards per attempt and thrown nine touchdown passes and 18 interceptions.

They've collectively posted a 26.4 Total QBR, which is -- and there's no way to slice this -- awful. We might have been spoiled by impressive rookie seasons in years past, but if we go back to 2018 -- the last draft with five first-round quarterbacks -- that group had posted a collective QBR of 47.2 by the time Week 4 rolled around. Just two of those five quarterbacks from three years ago had started a game, but Baker Mayfield had already become a folk hero by leading the Browns to their first win in almost two years, and Sam Darnold and Josh Allen each had victories under their belt. They would finish the season with a collective QBR of 42.4, a mark this year's passers will need to get hustling to match.

Let's look at the four rookie first-round quarterbacks who have started a game this season and take a closer look into what's going on with them, focusing closely on their Week 3 performances. (This leaves out Davis Mills, who was drafted in the third round, and No. 3 overall pick Trey Lance, who has been used almost exclusively as a short-yardage runner.) We probably can't draw long-term conclusions from what we've seen, but there are certainly things to keep an eye on for each in the weeks to come.

I'll start with a rookie who had one of the worst starts in league history to kick off his career and explain why the problems stretch well beyond the guy taking snaps in Chicago:

Jump to a rookie QB:
Justin Fields | Mac Jones
Trevor Lawrence | Zach Wilson

Justin Fields, Chicago Bears

Numbers so far: 14-of-35 passing (40%) for 138 yards with no TD passes, one INT; 7.0 Total QBR (32nd in NFL); 14 carries, 46 yards, 1 TD

There are a lot of ways to talk about what went wrong for Fields and the Bears in his first NFL start, against the Browns on Sunday. I talked about it at length on my podcast with The Athletic's Robert Mays earlier this week. One play that has come up on the internet over the past few days does a good job of encapsulating everything that the Bears struggled with, so I'm going to break that down at length.

The play is a third-and-9 in the fourth quarter with the Bears trailing by 17 points. Let's look at what Fields sees at the snap and determine how this play broke down, with some help from former NFL offensive lineman Geoff Schwartz, who helped me understand the mistakes:

The Browns are showing as many seven possible pass-rushers, although the Bears really only have to account for six. There are the four down linemen, safety John Johnson (43) lurking in the slot and two linebackers rolled up in the A-gaps opposite center Sam Mustipher (67). This is often referred to as a "mug" look or pressure. Plenty of NFL defenses show this on third downs, and it can stress out even the most seasoned of quarterbacks and centers. The Bears are not seasoned in either spot; Mustipher is an undrafted free agent making his 10th career start, and Fields was in his first.

The Bears have a five-man protection called to block whomever the Browns decided to send. The Bears are sending out five receivers, which leaves five men to block. Those five are going to block the five most dangerous rushers the Browns are threatening to send. Given that the shortest path to the quarterback is through the gaps in the middle of the line, the simplest way of doing this is by initially planning on blocking the five players in the center of the field.

To block this up, the Bears use a half-slide protection to split the defense in two. At the snap, Mustipher turns to the right, so the Bears have three blockers for four possible rushers. Mustipher's initial responsibility is linebacker Jeremiah Owusu-Koramoah (28) in the A-gap. Right guard James Daniels (68) should take on Malik Jackson (97). Germain Ifedi (74) is responsible for the most threatening edge rusher, which will likely be Takkarist McKinley (55). Running back David Montgomery (32) is in the backfield, but he's running a route, so we know either Johnson or (less likely) McKinley are going to be taking him in coverage. Both guys could theoretically rush the passer, but that would leave Fields an easy read to throw to an uncovered Montgomery.

The first issue here is that Mustipher should have slid to the left. We'll get to why in a minute. The Browns are expecting him to slide to the left. Typically, when a team wants to send one of its two mugged-up linebackers after the quarterback, it waits to see in which direction the center slides and blitzes the linebacker heading in the opposite direction. In this case, the Browns are expecting Mustipher to slide to the left, so they send Owusu-Koramoah to blitz and drop Malcolm Smith (56) into coverage. Instead, Mustipher turns right into the blitzing linebacker. The linebackers also pause for a split second at the snap, causing more uncertainty up front.

On top of that, in addition to the center sliding the wrong way, the Bears blow the protection on the right side. Mustipher doesn't see Owusu-Koramoah coming immediately and sets for Jackson instead of the guy in the A-gap; Ifedi takes McKinley; Johnson drops into coverage against Montgomery; and Daniels blocks nobody. Owusu-Koramoah takes a slight step backward and then sprints forward and gets to run totally unblocked directly up the A-gap at Fields. That's a catastrophe.

Things go wrong in a different way on the left side of the line. Here, the Bears have two linemen and three defenders to account for. Left guard Cody Whitehair (65) has to account for Smith before the snap. Left tackle Jason Peters (71) has a difficult assignment. He is responsible for what is known as a dual read, where he has to block one of two guys who can come at the quarterback. Working from the inside out, Peters' first assignment is Jadeveon Clowney (90), who is playing defensive tackle on this snap. If Clowney drops into coverage or doesn't need to be blocked, Peters then has to work outside toward his second assignment, who is superstar edge rusher Myles Garrett (95). If all three rush, Garrett is going to be unblocked, so Fields has to know he's "hot" from his blindside and get the ball out.

If Mustipher had slid to the left, the Bears would have been three vs. three on that side, with Peters, Whitehair and Mustipher against Garrett, Clowney and one of the blitzing linebackers. That's still going to be difficult, but it's putting your two best pass-blockers (in theory) against the opposing team's two best pass-rushers. The Browns would then have Daniels and Ifedi against the other linebacker in the A-gap, Jackson and McKinley, with Ifedi making the dual read.

It's better for Ifedi to make the dual read than Peters on this play for a couple of reasons. One is that the Browns' best pass-rusher is on Peters' side of the field. If someone's going to come free, you would probably prefer McKinley to Garrett. On top of that, if three guys come against the two rushers, Fields is hot and needs to know to get the ball out quickly. As a right-handed quarterback, you would rather ask Fields to recognize that he's hot to his front side and throw accordingly than ask him to recognize that from his blind side. Quarterbacks inevitably have to deal with throwing hot from their blind side, but you would rather not ask him to do so with a Defensive Player of the Year candidate running free on third-and-long.

In reality, Smith drops out, and the left side of the line diagnoses the situation correctly, but Peters gets overmatched physically. Whitehair initially sets to block Smith when he lingers at the line for that first step after the snap; but when Smith doesn't come, Whitehair proceeds to block the next most threatening rusher, Clowney. Peters initially sets to block Clowney, but when Whitehair takes Clowney, Peters then has to work outside toward Garrett. By the time Whitehair can turn and get situated toward the sideline, Clowney has already rushed past him and begun to threaten Fields.

Fields can't step up because Owusu-Koramoah is running free up the A-gap. Fields drifts a step backward, which creates an easy rushing lane for McKinley past Ifedi, who thinks his quarterback will be closer to the line of scrimmage. Fields eludes McKinley, but Garrett has a full head of steam and chases Fields down for his final sack of the day.

The offensive line didn't have a great time dealing with this, but this is more on Bears coach Matt Nagy than anybody else. Why?

Peters is being asked to do something he physically cannot do. A 27-year-old Peters would have had no trouble dual reading two solid defensive lineman at the line of scrimmage and working from a defensive tackle to an edge rusher. At age 39 and with two torn Achilles tendons and a torn ACL in his past, Peters is not being asked to block one of two solid defensive linemen; he's being asked to set to block Clowney and then adjust in midplay to block Garrett, arguably the league's best edge rusher, without a chip or any help. This would be a tough assignment for a superstar left tackle, and Peters isn't that guy at this point of his career. If Mustipher slides left, Peters doesn't have to dual read the two linemen, but Nagy has to know that Mustipher and Fields are both inexperienced when it comes to setting protections.

Fields is being thrown in the deep end with one hand tied behind his back. This five-man protection is an uncomfortable look for a quarterback on third-and-long facing as many as seven possible rushers. Fields might be facing double A-gap pressure, in which case the Browns would have a free runner on third-and-long. The Browns could dial up an exotic blitz or a sim pressure and overload one side of the line to mess with his protection to try to create a free rush for Garrett.

Most veteran quarterbacks would typically deal with this by changing or adding to the protection concept. Cole Kmet (85) is in the slot; the Bears could have motioned him back into the formation and asked him to become part of the protection on the left side, leaving them with three blockers versus three linemen on both sides of the line. Kmet would have been up against Garrett, which would have been a mismatch, but even if he moved inline and ran a route, he would have at least taken some of the pressure off of Peters and forced Garrett to take a longer path to the quarterback around the edge.

Whether it's because the Bears don't trust Fields to make these adjustments, he isn't ready to change protections at the line of scrimmage or Nagy & Co. thought they could block it up with their five-man protection, they don't add anybody on to help out. The Browns only end up sending five men, so it wasn't as if the protection was outmanned, but the Bears were not able to hold up 5-on-5.

The Bears sent out a five-man protection in the first place. If he didn't trust his quarterback enough to add on to or change the protection, one way for Nagy to help keep Fields safe would have been to send more than five pass protectors. Kmet isn't Rob Gronkowski when it comes to blocking, but why couldn't the Bears have used a play in which Kmet's initial responsibility was to block?

Part of being a sound offensive playcaller and head coach is knowing the situation. This is third-and-long. The Bears need to protect Fields long enough for a receiver to get open past the sticks. It's the down and distance in which a defense is likely to send pressure and get after the opposing quarterback to force a quick throw or create a sack. If you don't trust your quarterback to get in the right protection after seeing the defensive front, you need to give him the best possible chance of succeeding with your playcall.

On paper in Nagy's playbook, the protection rules probably say that Mustipher should have blocked to the left and/or that it's reasonable to ask the left tackle to dual two defensive lineman so you can get by against possible double-A gap pressure with five-man protection. In the reality of this football game given who was involved and how poorly the offensive line had played throughout this contest, it was negligent.

Nagy ignored everything that happened to this point. This third down wasn't one random snap in the middle of a successful game. This was the fourth quarter of a game in which the Bears were putting on one of the worst offensive performances in league history. Fields had already been sacked seven times. By my charting, the Bears had used five-man protections on 20 snaps before this third down; those 20 plays had produced 14 hurries and six sacks. Garrett had gotten close enough to Fields over the course of the day that he would have been able to tell you what deodorant the rookie was wearing. Fields had spent the entire game under duress.

In the short term, why would you send out a five-man protection on an obvious passing down? Your quarterback can't or won't add to the protection if the Browns show a blitz. Cleveland knows that you can't adjust, that your linemen aren't very good and that your debuting quarterback is probably shell-shocked. Fields didn't have time to attempt a single deep pass all game, so the Browns didn't have to worry about getting beat downfield, and they were able to squeeze the rookie's throwing windows.

Tampa Bay Buccaneers coach Bruce Arians and offensive coordinator Byron Leftwich sending out a five-man protection and working out of empty on third down would be fine, because they have a quarterback and an offensive line able to diagnose this stuff correctly on the fly. Nagy doesn't, even though the protection has the rules to account for that as written in the playbook. What might work on paper wasn't working in reality, and Nagy either could not or did not adjust.

In the big picture, Nagy's job is to help develop Fields into the long-term starter for the Bears. The No. 11 overall pick spent this entire game getting battered. The Bears had virtually no hope of winning at this point of the fourth quarter, and their only prayer would have been Fields staying upright and hitting a few big plays. He does need reps where he'll need to read whether he's hot and get the ball out on third down, but those reps don't need to come against one of the league's most imposing front fours at the end of a game during which he had already been hit so many times. This is the sort of game that leads to a young quarterback staring down at the rush and developing lingering bad habits, and Nagy was still comfortable throwing the future of the franchise to the wolves in the fourth quarter.

Zoom out and others have raised the questions I won't get to here. The scheme the Bears ran on Sunday didn't play to Fields' strengths. There were virtually no designed rollouts or bootlegs to get him out of the pocket. Chicago didn't max protect to try to give Fields time to take a shot downfield. We didn't see any (or many) of the creative run concepts that the Baltimore Ravens have run with Lamar Jackson and the San Francisco 49ers have borrowed for Trey Lance. If Nagy's scheme had been working, those questions wouldn't have mattered. With his plans flaming out in spectacular fashion, he didn't have a Plan B.

In a way, Sunday's performance reaffirmed what Nagy has said all year: that Andy Dalton is and should be the starting quarterback. When asked about it earlier this month, the coach said that he wouldn't reveal whether Dalton would be his starter after the longtime Cincinnati Bengals signal-caller returns from his knee injury because the answer constituted "scheme." The last time the Bears were so insistent about "scheme" was when they traded a draft pick to the Jacksonville Jaguars for Nick Foles a year ago because he knew Nagy's scheme. Foles knew it well enough to post a 36.0 QBR a year ago, before the Bears signed a new starter and drafted a quarterback in the first round to replace the former Super Bowl MVP.

Frankly, Nagy and the Bears' front office haven't earned the benefit of the doubt. General manager Ryan Pace is the one who gave Mike Glennon a three-year, $45 million deal and then traded up to draft Mitchell Trubisky ahead of Patrick Mahomes and Deshaun Watson in the 2017 draft. Nagy was hired to develop Trubisky and failed to turn him into a viable pro starter or the head of even a league-average offense. When replacing the kicker didn't solve Chicago's problems, Nagy fired offensive coordinator Mark Helfrich, gave up playcalling and then took it back again. The Bears traded for Foles, and when that failed, they signed Dalton and traded up again to draft Fields. It's difficult to ascertain how the Bears are heading in the right direction despite all those moves. On Sunday, it was clear to see that Fields was overwhelmed and didn't have the answers he needed; I'm not sure whether Nagy was or will be capable of providing them.


Trevor Lawrence, Jacksonville Jaguars

Numbers so far: 64-of-118 passing (54.2%) for 669 yards with five TD passes, seven INTs; 23.1 Total QBR (30th in NFL); nine carries, 46 yards

I wrote a fair amount about Lawrence when I dug into the 0-2 teams last week. In Week 3, we saw some growth mixed in with continued problems. Just 16.1% of his passes were off target against the Cardinals, which was right around half his off-target rate from the first two weeks of 2021. On the other hand, he was hit on more than 30% of his dropbacks in a game in which his offensive line ranked 11th in pass block win rate. He threw two interceptions, although the first was more of a drop by Jacob Hollister; Lawrence's pass wasn't optimally placed, but it was a pass his tight end should have caught.

The pick-six, on the other hand, was on Lawrence. Up 19-17 and facing a second-and-6 in the third quarter, the Jags tried a flea-flicker to spring a big play. It could have worked, as safety Budda Baker bit on the run fake and sprung DJ Chark downfield for what might have been a long touchdown pass. Unfortunately for the Jags, J.J. Watt had already penetrated through the line to stop the rush attempt and just continued on to threaten Lawrence. The rookie signal-caller didn't have time to look downfield or set his feet. While a more experienced quarterback might have eaten the sack or thrown the ball away, Lawrence tried to hit a checkdown to Hollister. Cornerback Byron Murphy was able to jump it for an easy touchdown return:

There are unquestionably moments where you see why Lawrence was the No. 1 overall pick. His touchdown pass to Chark on Sunday would have fit in just fine with the highlight reel of Aaron Rodgers throws from the night game against the 49ers. Lawrence gets a mirrored route concept against quarters coverage and initially works to the short side of the field. When there's nothing there, he goes to the far side and sees a tiny window to hit Chark in the back of the end zone. Most quarterbacks can't make this throw, and others try to and fail. Lawrence hits his spot with a perfect pass:

Most of the time, Lawrence looks like a guy adjusting to a faster game with smaller windows as opposed to someone utterly and completely overmatched. His progress there isn't going to be linear from drive to drive or week to week. It shouldn't be a surprise for any rookie quarterback to go through this, even if it was reasonable to hope that a guy who stepped in at Clemson as a true freshman and looked like a seasoned veteran from the jump would be able to repeat that at the NFL level.

More concerning is that the actual NFL vets around him don't look like they're confident in Urban Meyer's scheme. Jacksonville tape is littered with plays in which receivers and linemen don't look to be doing the right thing or end up in the right place, and it's blowing up opportunities in the process. Is that on the players? On Meyer? It's difficult to say in some cases without knowing the playcalls, but it's happening frequently enough that the coach has to take some of the blame. I'm confident Lawrence will smooth things out as the season goes along and look like the guy we expected coming out of college on a more frequent basis. The same might not be true for Meyer.


Mac Jones, New England Patriots

Numbers so far: 81-of-120 passing (67.5%) for 737 yards with two TD passes, three INTs; 52.0 Total QBR (21st in NFL); six carries, 28 yards

Jones had the best day of any of the quarterbacks from Week 3, which isn't saying much when you consider that he posted a 50.0 QBR in a 28-13 loss to the Saints. His final stat line wasn't particularly impressive, as he finished 30-of-51 passing for just 270 yards with a touchdown and three interceptions.

Virtually all of the big events require qualifiers. He was hit in motion (and Jakobi Meyers' pick attempt on a mesh concept led the wideout to stop his route) on the first interception, and Jonnu Smith comically dropped a completion into Malcolm Jenkins' hands on the pick-six. The third interception was on a fourth-and-10 with 15 seconds left in the game. At the same time, Jones' touchdown pass was a 50-50 prayer of a pass lobbed up under pressure to Kendrick Bourne, who made a great catch and somehow managed to stay in bounds before scoring.

Facing a tough Saints defense, there were both positives and negatives to take away from Jones' performance. Let's start with the good side of things: He generally took the easy completions and operated effectively when the Patriots were running quick game. When he held onto the ball for no more than 2.5 seconds, he was 12-of-16 for 108 yards. After some early struggles, the Patriots went to quick game for the final drive of the first half and for chunks of the second half, and he was able to move the ball. At the same time, one of the reasons he might have had success was because the Saints were comfortably ahead and happy to cede underneath completions.

When he was asked to hold the ball and make plays from deeper drops, Jones wasn't anywhere near as effective. When he held the ball past that 2.5-second mark, he was 18-of-35 for just 162 yards and five first downs. If we look at it slightly differently and just consider the passes that the NFL classifies as "deep" -- 16-plus yards downfield in the air -- Jones was 3-of-18 for 66 yards. Quarterbacks aren't going to post gaudy completion percentages on those attempts, but NFL Next Gen Stats projected him to complete 36.8% of those pass attempts. He hit on 16.7% instead.

The No. 15 overall pick generally has the arm strength to make those throws, but it feels like just about everything has to be right for things to go smoothly. On Sunday, it wasn't. The Patriots don't really have guys capable of separating against the Saints' cornerbacks, which led to a bunch of low-percentage deep shots. Their tight ends can be mismatches, but Smith struggled through a few drops and half-drops in a frustrating afternoon. Losing James White to a hip injury cost Jones a safety valve and a player the Saints would have otherwise needed to worry about in coverage underneath. The offensive line didn't have its best day, and Jones was inconsistent in dealing with pressure.

There were snaps in which the quarterback hung in the pocket, made the right steps and looked like a 10-year vet. There also were moments in which he drifted, panicked and made sloppy throws. People were wishcasting that Jones was Tom Brady before the draft when it came to working through progressions, but that was naive. Jones looked like a rookie at times in this game. There was one play in which he got hung up on Nelson Agholor working deep down the sideline against Cover 2, and in waiting for it to get open, Jones never got to Meyers coming wide open over the middle of the field on a dig route and ended up getting sacked by Tanoh Kpassagnon. I would bet a lot of money that Brady would have worked to the high-low concept in the middle of the field for a big completion.

Meyers ended up looking like Jones' best friend for most of the day. With White hurt, Meyers ended up being a mismatch on linebackers and slot corners. Jones' biggest downfield gain of the day came when C.J. Gardner-Johnson fell down as Meyers broke his route to the sideline. The wideout narrowly kept his footing and went for 27 yards. Meyers has consistently been the Patriots' most effective receiver over the past two years; it wouldn't be a surprise if he led the team in targets in 2021.

Jones looks steadier than the other quarterbacks I watched in Week 3. That's a positive. The concerns with him coming out of Alabama, though, were about whether he would look as good without talent mismatches at virtually every position and what his upside would look like as a pro. I'm not sure we have answers to either question after three games, not that we should have expected to draw any meaningful conclusions. Sunday felt like a game in which he was hitting his head on his ceiling.


Zach Wilson, New York Jets

Numbers so far: 58-of-105 passing (55.2%) for 628 yards with two TD passes, seven INTs; 21.9 Total QBR (31st in NFL); four carries, 21 yards

Every one of these quarterbacks would acknowledge that they have some work to do, but only one of them was criticized publicly by a teammate. After Sunday's shutout loss to the Denver Broncos, Jets right guard Greg Van Roten had some advice for his teammate. "He's got to learn this is the NFL and you have to get the ball out," the veteran said. "You can't hold onto it and try to make a play and throw it deep down the field."

I'm not going to say that Van Roten is wrong, and the criticism was unquestionably meant in a constructive way, but it's not as if the fatal flaw in an otherwise-humming Jets offense has been Wilson holding onto the ball for too long. It's tough to find much going right for the Jets after three weeks, and everyone should share in some of the blame. Yes, that includes Van Roten.

Let's start with how things should be on paper. We've seen the Gary Kubiak/Mike Shanahan offense make life easier for quarterbacks. First-time offensive coordinator Mike LaFleur is running a version of this attack in New York. There are plenty of facets to this offense, but at its core, it is designed around running the ball effectively and creating big plays off play-action.

How's that going? Not well. The Jets rank 24th in rushing defense-adjusted value over average (DVOA) and 23rd in expected points added (EPA) per designed rush attempt, and that's the highlight. Wilson has been a total nonfactor on play-action, going 11-of-21 passing for 109 yards with two interceptions and a completion percentage over expectation (CPOE) of minus-12.1%. His 12.4 QBR on play-action is the worst mark for any quarterback in football through three weeks. When he does hold the ball for more than 2.5 seconds, Van Roten's instincts have been accurate: Wilson's 9.6 QBR ranks last among the 32 quarterbacks.

Without an effective play-action game to create throwing lanes across the middle of the field, the No. 2 overall pick has been stuck trying to attack the sidelines and deep downfield. He ranks 31st in QBR on throws over the middle of the field, with a CPOE 15.7% below expectation. His QBR is 25 points higher on throws to the sideline, which is an anomaly in a league in which passers have collectively posted a QBR nearly 15 points lower on throws to the sideline.

On Sunday, Wilson was 8-of-18 for 38 yards and two interceptions between the hashes. The second interception came on a play in which Van Roten was beat immediately at the line of scrimmage by DeShawn Williams, who blew it up before it ever got started. Wilson actually did a good job of eluding the rush, stepping up in the pocket and finding an open receiver, only for his pass to go through Braxton Berrios' hands for a pick.

This wasn't the only time the receivers let down Wilson. Early in the game, LaFleur dialed up a core concept for the passing game in running Michael Carter out of the backfield and giving him a two-way option route against linebacker Justin Strnad. Carter broke to the middle of the field for what should have been a significant gain, only for Carter to drop the pass. The Jets are still working on their choice routes, which led to this bizarre procession of receivers on Sunday.

Camp revelation Elijah Moore has been the inverse of Ja'Marr Chase; while the Bengals standout was reportedly a mess over the summer before looking exactly as promised once the meaningful games began, Moore's training camp stardom hasn't extended to the regular season. The second-rounder has eight catches, and Moore was averaging 3.7 yards per target before suffering a concussion on Sunday.

The line didn't help matters. The Broncos have a legitimately good defense with a brilliant defensive mind for a coach, but the Jets made it too easy at times. One blown protection was almost comical, as the Jets totally turned nose tackle Mike Purcell -- the guy standing directly over the center with the football -- free for an immediate rush on Wilson. Carter did his best to try to save the day, but there's no universe in which blocking a 328-pound tackle with a 201-pound running back is a good idea, not that it's what the Jets were intending:

The Jets have so many other problems before even getting to Wilson holding the ball for too long. Their screen package was breathtakingly ineffective, with three attempts producing a total of three yards, plus a fourth getting called back for illegal men downfield. (Wilson could have gotten the ball out earlier on that one.) So far this season, Wilson has thrown eight screens and completed seven of them for a total of 13 yards. It's difficult, if not impossible, to find something the Jets have done consistently right on offense through three weeks.

Things will get better, if only because it's hard for the offense to get much worse. The Jets have scored just 20 points all season, and 10 of those came in what would charitably be described as garbage time. Wilson isn't what's wrong with this team right now, but he doesn't have the experience to make it right.