The Boston Celtics have been down this road before with Jaylen Brown, most tellingly after the 2018 playoffs -- when Brown could have been the centerpiece in a trade with the San Antonio Spurs for Kawhi Leonard.
The Celtics were coming off a run to Game 7 of the conference finals. Four of their top six in postseason minutes were 23 or younger: Brown, Jayson Tatum, Marcus Smart, and Terry Rozier. Two prime-aged stars -- Kyrie Irving and Gordon Hayward -- were set to return from injury the next season.
The Celtics decided they were good enough that they didn't need to compromise their future to boost their present with Leonard.
But the exuberance about Boston's young core coming within one win of the Finals blurred analysis of its broader postseason run. A lot of us zoomed past Boston coming within one loss of bowing out in the first round to an untested Milwaukee Bucks team. In between, the Celtics upended the young Philadelphia 76ers in a five-game win more ragged than convincing.
We know what happened next: The 2019 Celtics imploded, Irving and Hayward left, and the Lakers beat out Boston for Anthony Davis. Suddenly, the notion that Boston had been set up to contend for a decade seemed quaint. A decade? Ha. Next season is promised to no one.
Three years later, the Celtics have reached out about Kevin Durant, according to initial reports from ESPN's Adrian Wojnarowski. Brown would be the obvious centerpiece in any such trade.
These Celtics came within two games of the championship -- three wins and one round further than in 2018. They appeared to solve whatever chemistry problems they had early last season. They loaded up on depth, playmaking, and shooting with Malcolm Brogdon and Danilo Gallinari. They might be the championship favorite now. Why should a team so good trade a 25-year-old All-Star for a 33-year-old megastar who has played 90 games in three seasons and seems to grow unhappy, fast, wherever he goes?
But that "two games from the title" label is almost a Rorschach test. You can look at it and see a rising team with a historic defense one or two small tweaks from a title -- a team whose offense was undone more by fatigue and inexperience than any fundamental weakness.
Someone else might see a team who needed seven games to beat the Bucks without Khris Middleton-- then seven more to squeak by the Miami Heat with Kyle Lowry and Tyler Herro missing multiple games, and Jimmy Butler limping around the middle of the series. Miami came within a Butler triple of stealing Game 7 after Boston's offense went haywire (again). For the playoffs, Boston scored at a rate that would have ranked 21st in the regular-season.
Those offensive issues -- bizarre decision-making, stagnancy, amateurish turnovers -- tipped the Finals toward the Golden State Warriors, who, by the way, should be even better next season (along with other West contenders).
So, how convincing was Boston's playoff run? What if fatigue wasn't the biggest reason their offense sputtered? What if Brogdon and Gallinari -- both injury risks, the latter a liability on defense -- don't move the needle?
Durant doesn't move the needle on offense as much as grant you access to an entirely new measuring device. He is elite at almost literally everything. He solves every problem. He's a steadier, more accomplished playmaker than Brown -- a regular at five or six dimes per game. Brown last season averaged a career-high 3.5 assists to 2.7 turnovers -- not good enough. Brown outplayed Tatum in the Finals, but that may have been in part because his playmaking limitations placed too heavy a burden on Tatum.
Alongside Tatum, Durant would not have to carry Boston through regular-season doldrums the way he did as the Nets fell apart around him. Durant's supernova package of offensive skills could have a compounding effect on Boston's offense larger than statistical projections might predict. Boston's offense has backslid when Brown plays without Tatum -- stretches Durant could handle.
Even as he loses athleticism in his late 30s, Durant will remain productive as a seven-foot jump-shooter -- a new-age, late-career Dirk Nowitzki. Snaring Brogdon fortifies Boston's perimeter depth, easing the blow of trading multiple guards and wings for Durant.
In 2018, Leonard was the flight risk. He had one year left on his contract, and wanted Los Angeles.
In 2022, Brown is more a flight risk than Durant. Brown can hit unrestricted free agency in two seasons. Boston can offer him a contract extension this summer, but it makes no financial sense for Brown. Durant has four guaranteed years left on his contract.
If the Celtics think Brown is likely to bolt, they should be more aggressive chasing Durant. I have no idea what Brown might do in two years, but I have not yet gotten the sense the Celtics are operating from some position of fear. If Brown does enter unrestricted free agency, the Celtics can offer the most years and money. If Brown makes All-NBA in *either* of the next two seasons, he will become eligible for a supermax extension only Boston could offer. Players rarely turn that down.
But Brown has never made All-NBA. He's never come close. He's made one All-Star appearance despite playing almost his entire career on a top team. Most advanced stats paint him as a very good player, but not a great one -- something like the 20th or 25th-best player in the league. He's almost 26. If the Celtics think he has peaked, that should also amp up their aggression with Durant.
Of course, the Nets would want much more than Brown. The ask probably starts with Marcus Smart and multiple picks, some unprotected swap rights, perhaps another young player. (The Nets should ask for Robert Williams III over Smart. Maybe they'd do that if talks ever develop further. Maybe they think Boston views Williams III as a non-starter.)
The Celtics might argue Brooklyn is not in a strong negotiating position. What's the best offer right now? The Toronto Raptors don't want to even discuss Scottie Barnes, sources say. Have Toronto and Brooklyn even had a detailed conversation? Do we know for sure Phoenix has offered or will offer the best it can do for now: Mikal Bridges, Cameron Johnson, four unprotected first-round picks and three swaps? Does Brooklyn have any interest in Miami Heat packages that don't include Bam Adebayo?
Even before the Minnesota Timberwolves warped the trade market by flipping five draft assets for Rudy Gobert, several smart people around the league termed the very act of trading Durant "impossible" in conversations with ESPN. There was no way to approximate fair value. A player of Durant's caliber with so many years locked in had never before become available.
The Nets are probably waiting for Durant's camp to realize that, and maybe for Durant to retract his trade request. The Nets have not given up on this scenario, sources say.
Suitors are waiting to see if Brooklyn concludes that kind of reunion is not possible. Durant could accelerate that process by publicly or privately explaining his trade request, and emphasizing he will not back off. Would such a stance mean sitting out -- as Ben Simmons did last season? I don't know. League insiders repeat the trope that Durant "is not wired that way" -- that he loves the game too much. But that is speculation. Time will tell.
Even if Durant reports, will he be content? Will he sulk? Will trade talk become a day-to-day distraction? The Nets may not want to live that scenario. It's draining. The wild card has always been whether Joe Tsai, the Nets governor, would ever mandate his front office just do a deal: take 70 cents on the dollar, end the melodrama, move on. Rival suitors are hoping for that kind of intervention.
Every tipping of the leverage scales matters because the extras matter. Start here: If the Nets want Brown, Smart, and some draft equity -- say two picks and two swaps -- the Celtics should walk away.
That is probably a minority view league-wide, befuddling to the "But it's Kevin freaking Durant!" crowd.
Trading age 25 for 33 is risky. The notion that Boston might contend for 10 years looked absurd after their disastrous 2019, but they made the conference finals in 2020 and the Finals last season. They are doing it after all.
Durant's injury risk increases with age. He became disenchanted enough to leave the Oklahoma City Thunder and the Warriors, and he's disenchanted again. Why should any team assume they'd get even three seasons of a healthy and content Durant?
Is it worth it for just two -- the length of Brown's current deal? Not if the deal includes Smart and draft equity. Boston's starting five in that scenario might be Brogdon, Tatum, Durant, Al Horford, and Williams III. The core bench: Derrick White, Grant Williams, Payton Pritchard, and Gallinari.
That's a great team -- probably title favorites! But they are nothing like the Durant-era Warriors in terms of championship probability, and it's easy to envision how they might fall short. Brogdon misses dozens of games every season. White was afraid to shoot in several high-leverage playoff games. Pritchard struggled to stay on the floor against the Heat and Warriors; he's 24, barely a year younger than Brown. Grant Williams is solid, but how much better will he get?
Williams III hadn't appeared in more than 52 games before 2021-22; he suffered a meniscus injury late last season, and played through knee pain in the playoffs. Horford is 36. He had a major bounce back after essentially taking a season off with the Thunder. What does he look like after a long playoff run? What about at age 38?
Smart might be Boston's best passer. He just won Defensive Player of the Year! Boston had by far the league's best defense from mid-January on, and its scheme depends in large part on Smart's ability to switch across every position.
Smart is more to Boston than a good player. He's a keystone in its structural identity. Brogdon and White are good defenders, but they can't do what Smart does. You almost have to reimagine the team's very constitution with a regular point guard in Smart's place. Meanwhile, defense may be the part of Durant's game that declines first with age.
Trading Brown, Smart, and picks for Durant makes Boston bigger, older, and thinner. It probably improves their title odds this season, but not enough -- here at least -- to justify the hit to Boston's medium- and long-term future. (Durant should also want Smart on the Celtics if he ends up there.)
Boston is already in the inner circle of contenders. Even if you consider their postseason run overblown, the totality of that run and Boston's utter demolition of the league in the last half of the regular-season suggests a truly great team coalescing.
The upside of opening the vault for Durant is a slightly better chance at the ring now. The downside scenario is Tatum entering unrestricted free agency in 2026, looking around, and asking: How can I win big with this? Trading Brown, Smart, and picks for Durant would make it harder for Boston to upgrade as Durant ages. Keeping that stuff would put Boston in play for a third star around Tatum and Brown, or help them upgrade one smaller deal at a time.
It's easy to counter all this. Tatum is a good bet to hit supermax eligibility ahead of his potential free agency; it's doubtful he'd turn down such a windfall. Smart's trade value may never be higher. Great teams low on trade assets -- like the hypothetical Durant-Tatum Celtics -- can always find buyout guys. And if Tatum is a legitimate No. 1 superstar, isn't he alone enough to keep Boston afloat amid any doomsday scenario -- and buy the front-office time?
If Boston somehow convinced the Nets to accept White in Smart's place, Brooklyn would demand more draft compensation -- say, three picks and two swaps. White's theoretical inclusion should at least make Boston lose some sleep. That's a hard one. In the end, I'd lean toward declining and keeping the future wide open.
One reason: Brown may still have room to grow as a playmaker. His weak spots are real. His handle gets wonky, and he loses his balance at weird times; handsy defenders can swipe the ball from him, and a lot of Brown's stumbling heaves out of traffic are lollipops -- prey for pick-six steals.
He sometimes holds the ball one beat too long instead of making the simple play:
He misses some passes, or sees them late:
These blips of bad timing show up in mundane plays:
Dish that early, and Smart has an open triple. Instead, Brown brings the defense toward Smart.
He played a big role in some of Boston's late-game playoff meltdowns. He would sometimes go one-on-one against good defenders instead of using screens to generate favorable switches:
Brown's inexplicable last-minute drive at Adebayo with Boston nursing a lead nearly cost the Celtics Game 7 of the conference finals.
Some of this is tunnel-vision. Some is Brown's earned confidence in his driving and finishing. He is a rampaging downhill driver, and can rise up for tricky floaters, turnarounds, and step-backs over smaller defenders. He has hit 48% on long 2s over the last two seasons -- an elite number. Those are playoff shots.
There is evidence beyond Brown's assists that he is making real strides as a secondary ball handler. Brown ran 18.2 pick-and-rolls per 100 possessions, up from 12 the year before, per Second Spectrum. (Durant ran about 18.6.) Boston averaged 1.05 points when Brown shot out of those actions or dished to a teammate who fired -- 26th among 181 ball handlers with at least 200 pick-and-rolls. Durant ranked 11th, at 1.084 points per possession.
Brown recorded assists out of pick-and-rolls at a career-high rate, per Second Spectrum. His numbers out of isolations are trending the same way, and were almost on par with Durant's.
He grew more comfortable against conservative pick-and-roll coverages, learning to freeze help defenders and whip the ball to corner shooters:
He would occasionally slow down in the lane, trap defenders on his hip, and wait for the defense to expose something:
Weaponizing his pull-up 3 would be a game-changer against those schemes. Four seasons ago, Brown attempted only 29 pull-up 3s. A year later, he shot an ugly 29% on 1.7 attempts per game. He hit 35% on 2.5 per game last season, and drained 19-of-44 in the playoffs. The work is paying off.
Brown's bag is getting deeper. He has nasty hesitation dribbles with both hands:
He can transition from hesitations to filthy crossovers in both directions. Sit on that, and Brown might fake the crossover and zip into a right-handed in-and-out dribble -- a move that gets him going downhill.
Brown will always be mechanical. He's sometimes slow reading blitzes -- retreating too far instead of threading a quick bounce pass to his screener. He's at ease when he knows what's coming, but gets tentative and confused when opponents switch schemes on the fly. You rarely see Brown throw pocket passes. His timing and touch on entry passes and lobs to Williams III are iffy.
He seems to prefer a clear, open floor. Boston rarely runs complex multi-player actions for him, and has several pet plays -- including corner sets -- designed to catapult him into space with easy reads in front of him.
But you see growth. Brown makes the simple play more than he used to. Boston's offensive ecosystem doesn't always help him; spacing is sometimes cramped, and a lot of players stand still off the ball. (Brown could move around a little more too; he's a regular 40%-plus on catch-and-shoot 3s.)
He is beginning to realize all the options that open up when he is either screener or ball handler in unconventional wing-wing pick-and-rolls designed to hunt mismatches; Brown and Tatum have only scratched the surface of how they might work in tandem:
The gap between where Brown is now and a regular All-NBA candidate is perhaps the hardest one to cross. Maybe Brown never bridges it. But he's showing glimpses of the right kinds of gains.
These are really hard choices. Reasonable and smart executives can disagree. Brown and the Celtics are good enough now that Boston can wager on continuity -- and on Brown improving -- instead of tossing away too much of its future for Durant.