AN INSIDE JOKE drifted through the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in March 2020 -- the last gathering of executives from all 30 NBA teams before the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic: If the NBA canceled the rest of the season, would the San Antonio Spurs' -- then 12th in the Western Conference -- 22-year playoff streak technically remain intact?
Even San Antonio executives chuckled. It was a macabre attempt to deflect fear of the virus, and an acknowledgement that the NBA's gold standard was entering the wilderness for the first time since an injury-aided tank job ended with the selection of Tim Duncan in 1997.
Between 1987 and 2011, the Spurs drafted five future Hall of Famers: David Robinson, Duncan, Tony Parker, Manu Ginobili, and Kawhi Leonard. They found them at the top of the first round, in the middle, at the bottom, even toward the end of the second round in Ginobili's case. It was a remarkable run for a franchise that built through the draft because it had limited free-agency appeal and seemed allergic to trades. The 2011 draft-day deal for Leonard seemed to position the Spurs for an unprecedented three-decade run near the top of what for 29 other teams is a boom-and-bust league.
After one title and six great seasons, it went haywire; Leonard wanted out. A perfect storm left the Spurs with perhaps less leverage than any team ever to trade an MVP-level superstar in his prime.
Three weeks after LeBron James bolted to the Los Angeles Lakers without pushing them to also acquire Leonard, San Antonio traded Leonard (plus Danny Green and $5 million in cash) to the Toronto Raptors for DeMar DeRozan, Jakob Poeltl and one first-round pick -- later used on Keldon Johnson, a rising power forward who attacks the rim as if it hurt his family.
The Spurs turned down several offers heavy on future first-round picks, sources said. Choosing to pair DeRozan with LaMarcus Aldridge -- who turned 33 the day after the Leonard trade -- seemed to prove the Spurs would never rebuild until Gregg Popovich retired.
No one is sure if Popovich will coach beyond this season, but several sources who know him cautioned in recent weeks that it would not surprise them if he returned for 2022-23. Popovich is 26 wins from Don Nelson's all-time record, but he is not running out the string just to claim it.
(The most common heir apparents mentioned in league and coaching circles today: Will Hardy, the longtime San Antonio assistant now working under Ime Udoka in Boston; Brett Brown; and Manu Ginobili, who rejoined San Antonio last week as an advisor. Becky Hammon will and should be in the mix along with mystery candidates and perhaps other members of the Spurs tree. Ginobili's appetite for coaching is unclear. Bill Self, head coach of Kansas, has faded out of the rumor mill.)
DeRozan and Aldridge are gone. So are Rudy Gay and Patty Mills -- the final link to teams that made back-to-back Finals in 2013 and 2014.
The Spurs have drafted well recently in the back of the lottery and the end of the first round. Fans are excited to see what those young players do without DeRozan and Aldridge soaking up possessions -- and, it should be noted, keeping the Spurs' midrange-heavy offense afloat.
But it's time to ask: What, exactly, are the Spurs doing here? Are they at risk of being trapped in mediocrity? Should they search for a star?
THE SPURS TALKED with the Philadelphia 76ers about Ben Simmons, but those talks have not gotten far, sources said. They sniffed around intriguing young free agents -- including Lauri Markkanen and John Collins, sources said -- but snared neither.
Three of San Antonio's young players aren't so young anymore: Dejounte Murray, probably San Antonio's best player, just turned 25. Derrick White is 27. They will earn about $31 million combined this season, a reminder that young teams get expensive fast -- and that Johnson and Lonnie Walker IV will soon get big raises. (Walker is extension eligible now.) Poeltl turns 26 in two weeks.
The Spurs used cap space on Doug McDermott, who is almost 30 -- not a move we'd associate with a rebuilding team.
It is hard to find anyone who thinks the Spurs have a foundational star among Murray, White, Johnson, Walker, Poeltl, Devin Vassell, Luka Samanic, Joshua Primo, and the rest. It's early, but that assessment seems correct. It's possible one or two cracks an All-Star Game; there have been lots of one- and two-time All-Stars, and there is a giant chasm between those players and perennial All-Stars who determine championships.
The best-odds pathway to those players is at the top of the draft. It's a common criticism of the post-Leonard Spurs that in dealing for a win-now floor-raiser (DeRozan) and keeping its veteran bench together, San Antonio missed its window for Zion Williamson, Ja Morant, and Cade Cunningham. (The Spurs have also -- justifiably -- turned down offers of single protected first-round picks for some of their core young guys, sources said.)
Critics dinged the Spurs for hanging on to Aldridge and DeRozan too long. They got nothing for Aldridge, but they were redeemed with DeRozan; snaring Thaddeus Young, one future first-round pick, and two seconds from the Chicago Bulls is a nice return.
Now, the thinking goes, San Antonio's young players have improved to the point that it's too late for these Spurs to bottom out.
Are we sure? There are reasons for pessimism about this single-season San Antonio team -- to wonder if the Spurs, almost by accident, have positioned themselves for a real chance at a top-five pick. Which teams in the West are you certain will win fewer games than the Spurs? That list ends at the Houston Rockets and Oklahoma City Thunder.
The Spurs profile as a bad offensive team that will have to work really hard for clean looks -- many of which will be long 2s. (Their old-fashioned shot profile didn't shift much when DeRozan and Aldridge sat.)
They could make up for that with stout defense. Murray and Poeltl are bulwarks up the middle -- Murray an All-Defense-level ball hawk with long arms and an apparent ability to be in two places at once, Poeltl a rock-sold rim-protector with nimble feet.
White is heady, willing to take charges galore. Young is an irritant with lightning-quick hands. Johnson is physical and fearless.
This is precisely the team San Antonio was when DeRozan hit the bench: terrible on offense, ultra stingy on defense.
In theory, that should amount to a .500-ish team. Maybe it will.
DEFENSES WILL TEST San Antonio's shooting at every turn, with the exception of McDermott, who fits with any combination of young Spurs. (The howling over McDermott's signing is misplaced, and reminds of the reaction to another rebuilding team -- the Detroit Pistons -- splurging on Kelly Olynyk. The best way to help young attacking ball handlers is to give them space. McDermott and Olynyk do that without adding so many wins as to harm lottery odds. McDermott has also turned into a sneaky-good finisher.)
Opponents will go under screens for Murray, White, Walker, Johnson, and Vassell. They will form a shell above the foul line, and dare those guys to hoist 3s. The result will often be a lot of side-to-side passing that generates little north-south traction.
There have been glimpses of San Antonio busting such schemes; Walker and White almost doubled their 3-point attempt rates last season, albeit mostly on catch-and-shoot looks. (Bad news: Their uptick in 3s came at the expense of rim attempts, per Cleaning The Glass.) White hit 34.6% -- a hair below league average. Popovich has been reluctant at times to pair Murray and White for this reason.
Still, the Spurs should be closer to 20th in 3-point attempt rate than dead last -- where they were for much of the DeRozan-Aldridge era.
Vassell hit 34.7% on five 3s per 36 minutes -- encouraging for a rookie wing. Johnson isn't shy, but he'll have to hit better than 33% on middling volume to coax defenders into running him off the arc -- closeouts that ignite his ferocious, bull-rushing drives.
Murray has become reliable on long 2s -- though not 3s -- and is cagey bobbing back and forth around screens to get to his comfort zones. Bryn Forbes will help, but at the expense of San Antonio's defense.
There is also a playmaking deficit here. Murray is an average-ish passer for his position and role. White has become more of a wing with Murray's emergence. Walker and Johnson are rim-assault scorers; Walker is frenetic, and often passes only at the last minute when he decides it is not safe to shoot. Such kickouts can produce, but they are also often long-distance heaves that come a beat late; the defense is ready, rotating out.
Young and Poeltl are nifty passers, and the Spurs will run some offense via handoffs and elbow actions. But the collective can only compensate so much for the lack of one killer creator.
THE SPURS ARE pretty switchy on defense, but they are also easy to switch against. None of them have brutalizing one-on-one games for size mismatches. Their guards and wings can roast opposing bigs, but that speed advantage dissipates when defenders sit back and invite jumpers.
Popovich has said the Spurs will run, and the best antidote to blah half-court offense is to avoid playing in the half court. The Spurs hit the gas in the bubble, when Aldridge was out, and played at an average pace last season -- fast by their standards.
Given roster turnover and their overall youth, I'm a little skeptical the Spurs will have an elite defense -- as stingy overall as they were in the minutes DeRozan sat. A lot of those minutes came against backups, and San Antonio's bench -- long an efficiency machine -- has been overhauled. Young seems like an obvious trade candidate; contenders have already inquired about him, sources said. (He would be a great fit with the Phoenix Suns playing the Dario Saric role.)
If this really is a top-five defense, the Spurs will be in the play-in race. If it's closer to 10th or average, this could be a painful season -- though with the reward of a high draft pick. It would seem almost impossible for the Spurs to be worse than Houston, Oklahoma City, Detroit, or the Orlando Magic. Beyond that, nothing is guaranteed. The Cleveland Cavaliers should add some wins, and everyone else is chasing the play-in. Landing in the No. 5 or 6 lottery slot brings better odds of moving up under revised rules.
Even if they disappoint this season, these Spurs' young core could develop into a good team -- and soon. Murray and White are in their primes. Walker has hit 37% on 3s, and has flashed the ability to be a solid secondary ball handler -- when he catches on the move, with a head start, and takes his time:
His passing and defense will improve.
You can see Johnson learning to slow down, change pace, and keep defenders off balance:
He has a decent floater, and even ran 250 pick-and-rolls last season.
Vassell could become San Antonio's Mikal Bridges -- and maybe more. He is already an absolute mauler on defense, capable of switching across four positions -- and enveloping smaller guards. What he does to Trae Young here borders on cruelty:
He is long enough to provide some rim protection. (Johnson is too.)
Vassell was mostly a stand-still option on offense, and that was fine for his rookie season. He hit 38% on corner 3s. He showed a pump-and-go game that usually ended with midrange pull-ups. Vassell is good at those. He's smooth with the ball, stops on a dime, and rises up with ease over smaller guards -- who often defend him because opponents have deemed Vassell a safe hiding place:
(Teams aren't really afraid to hide undersized and weak defenders on any of San Antonio's main perimeter guys. That's a bad sign. One silver lining is that most of those Spurs are tall enough to get launch clean mid-rangers over such players.)
Vassell will get more decisive in Year 2. He'll attack right away off the catch instead of giving the defense a chance to reset. He'll venture the one extra dribble that unlocks a layup, or some profitable pass.
Why should we put low ceilings on these players, or doubt the Spurs' development machine? No one saw Leonard's superstardom coming. There isn't a Leonard here, but if these guys stay together, the Spurs will grow into a good team. That's just what happens. The Lakers would probably be pretty good today had they kept their young, pre-LeBron James core together.
Of course, the Lakers shoved aside pretty much that entire young core to acquire two superstars. These young Spurs could be a 45- or even 50-win team in two or three seasons. But title contention requires superstars, and there doesn't appear to be one here. That's OK. There is no shame in being a good team. You can do that while hunting for stars.
San Antonio drafted three stars outside the lottery. Maybe they'll strike gold outside the top-5 again. (Look where other teams drafted Jimmy Butler, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Donovan Mitchell, Paul George, Rudy Gobert, Nikola Jokic, Devin Booker, Klay Thompson, and on and on.)
The Spurs have more future cap room than basically anyone. Re-signing their own guys will chip away at that; they could be pretty near the cap in the summer of 2023 if they re-sign Walker, Johnson, and Poeltl. Chasing restricted free agents -- the ones who best fit San Antonio's timetable -- is usually a losing game. (If the Grizzlies can't agree to an extension with Jaren Jackson Jr., the Spurs loom as an intriguing option.)
Aldridge aside, there is no indication superstar free agents want San Antonio's cap money. The Spurs have the means to trade for stars: all their future first-round picks, a bundle of extra draft assets, and good players on movable contracts. But dealing a bunch of stuff for some star with one or two years left on his deal is an enormous risk without ironclad assurances.
That's why Simmons -- with four years left on his contract -- is a logical target despite his finicky fit. It's unclear if the Spurs really want to re-engage Philadelphia, or if they have enough to trade without tossing in so many draft picks as to imperil the future.
And so: the wilderness. This is normalcy for so many franchises outside glamour markets. The Spurs were the constant exception, because they acquired exceptional players. Climbing back to the top without bottoming out is the NBA's greatest organizational challenge. Maybe the Spurs will bottom out this season -- or come close enough as to benefit from some lottery luck.
If not, the journey back up is uncertain.