The NBA playoffs are about adjustment and exploitation; teams are constantly adjusting to opponent lineups and play calls, which will often feature combinations rarely seen in the regular season. Then they will try to repeatedly exploit weaknesses, putting the opponent in a disadvantaged position. One such example of exploiting an opponent weakness is how Houston took advantage of Dallas' lineups featuring two big men in the frontcourt, especially when Dirk Nowitzki or Amar'e Stoudemire (or both) is on the floor.
To take advantage of the Mavs' defensive liabilities up front, the Rockets lifted a play I am very familiar with from the Phoenix Suns' old playbook: the "Elbow Get." Here's a breakdown of the play and how the Rockets ran against Dallas so adeptly and won the series.
Elbow Get defined
Elbow Get was originally designed in Phoenix to take advantage of the unique ballhandling and passing abilities of Boris Diaw and the elite, above-the-rim athleticism of Shawn Marion. As you can see from the diagram above, the bigs start at the elbows while the shooters fill the corners. The point guard hits the 4-man at the elbow then pins down for the wing in the strong corner. As soon as the 4 receives the ball, he goes into a middle pick-and-roll with the 5, who screens and rolls. As the 4 dribbles to the other side of the floor and the 5 rolls, the shooter coming off the pin down lifts up the now weakside 3-point line, giving the 4-man four distinct passing options (depending on what the defense does):
• Throw the lob to the rolling 5 for the dunk
• Hit the shooter in the strong corner (if his defender comes off him)
• Hit the weakside fill shooter lifting up the line
• Hit the weakside corner shooter
When performed in concert, with rapidity, the play is difficult to stop because there are so many moving parts, making it difficult for the opponent to play help defense (the spacing is key here, as well). When the opponent has two true bigs in the lineup, it means one of them is put in the uncomfortable situation of guarding a ball handler going into a pick-and-roll rather than coming out of one.
Houston's Elbow Get
The Rockets run Elbow Get to take advantage of Josh Smith's above-average passing and ballhandling, something I noted could be of benefit to them when they first signed him in December:
Smith does bring one strong offensive trait to the table, however: passing. He's made himself a threat by creating off the dribble and making plays for others, either out of shallow pick-and-rolls (particularly when the defense predictably sags off him) or off post-ups, where he can still overwhelm smaller defenders. He's not a quick playmaker -- the ball does stick in his hands -- but he more often than not will make the right play, provided he hasn't overextended himself into a tough situation. He also displays good awareness of where the double-team is coming from and makes the appropriate pass out.
Combined with Dwight Howard's explosion, and pitted against the defensively challenged Mavs frontcourt of Nowitzki and Stoudemire, it's like shooting fish in a barrel.
As you can see, Smith doesn't catch exactly at the elbow, and the pin-down/lift action from Pablo Prigioni and Trevor Ariza isn't executed crisply at all, but the general premise is true: The Rockets maintain spacing along the perimeter and allow the middle pick-and-roll to operate unhindered. As soon as Smith receives the ball, Howard sprints to set the screen, only to slip and dive directly to the front of the rim. Nowitzki and Stoudemire don't communicate well on the switch; J.J. Barea, Raymond Felton and Al-Farouq Aminu are all "hugged up" on their guys; and Smith delivers the perfect lob, which Howard finishes with authority. It's over in the blink of an eye.
The lob is the most desired outcome, but even when the initial action is sniffed out and well defended, Houston finds a way to take advantage.
Here, Dallas' frontcourt features the (comparatively speaking) more mobile Charlie Villanueva and defensive anchor Tyson Chandler. They execute the switch more smoothly, preventing Howard from the lob play, but now Howard has a "mouse in the house" -- a smaller player guarding him as he seals him in down low. Chandler does what he can to help, but Howard demonstrates excellent footwork with the up-and-under, drawing the foul. (Notice the slow execution on the weak side between Jason Terry and James Harden, but again, Harden achieves the desired spacing effect).
How to stop the unstoppable
Houston wisely exploited Dallas' defensive shortcomings, and it wasn't only on the front line. Let's go back to that first play with the Howard lob:
While it's easy to surmise that the weakside defenders are discouraged from helping, that's a cop out. In the far corner, Felton is hugged up on Corey Brewer, who shot a frigid 23.1 percent from the left corner this season (18-of-78), so sagging into the paint wouldn't have carried the usual cardinal sin of leaving the strong corner to help. On the near side, Aminu is watching the play and seeing it develop; in an ideal world, he would have anticipated and flooded the lane to obstruct Howard from taking off unimpeded, but he's rightfully worried about leaving Ariza, a 42 percent 3-point shooter from the right corner. That's where Barea should have dropped back and played free safety between Ariza and Prigioni.
Of course, such weakside gambling on odds wouldn't be necessary if the front line did its job. Either Nowitzki or Stoudemire should have noticed the set and dropped to prevent the roll (especially Stoudemire, who has run this exact play in Phoenix). In the other example (the Howard up-and-under that led to a foul), Villanueva makes a crucial mistake by not taking advantage of Howard's weak free throw shooting by immediately intentionally fouling; instead, he allows him to take two dribbles to the middle, upfake and then attempt a shot, opening himself to the risk of the three-point play. Even defensive stalwart Chandler makes the mistake of jumping out toward Smith after Howard has gone into his post-up, rather than sagging and forcing the kickout pass back to Smith, who shot 28 percent above the break this season (he was 0-for-1 from 3-point range at that juncture of the game).
That's precisely what happens here: Nowitzki does a better job of executing the switch and fights Howard from running straight to the rim or the block, fighting him down the lane. Chandler doesn't jump at Smith; rather he sags back, simultaneously fronting Howard and daring Smith to take the low-percentage shot. On the weak side, Prigioni and Ariza finally execute the pin down well, but Smith doesn't notice. Remember the scouting report? Smith isn't Diaw, a point guard in a power forward's body, who anticipates plays and recognizes defensive breakdowns instantly. He's more methodical, and much more inclined to look for his own shot, no matter how inept it might be from the perimeter (even though an attack of the space given would have forced the Mavs' D to react). Chandler successfully baits Smith into taking the 3, which is an infinitely better option for the Mavs to concede.
Ultimately, defending these types of plays comes down to several things: personnel (mobility, length and activity), preparation (players recognizing the play set, identifying the biggest threats) and, of course, communication. Dallas continued to trot out lineups that were missing two (if not all three) of those hallmarks, and in the end Houston exploited those holes and won the series.