Before we get into the specifics of the Tampa Bay Rays' series-tying Game 2 win on Wednesday, let's throw out an all-time leaderboard. These are the teams with best winning percentages in a season (including the playoffs) in games decided by two runs or fewer:
2020 Tampa Bay Rays (.714)
1909 Pittsburgh Pirates (.707)
1954 Cleveland Indians (.706)
1907 Chicago Cubs (.701)
Through Wednesday
Source: Elias
That list suggests what you think it does. After holding off the Los Angeles Dodgers 6-4 in Game 2, the Rays have the best winning percentage ever in close games, if you define close games as those being decided by one or two runs. They edged to the top of that list by winning Wednesday, but if they should lose a close one in Game 3 on Friday, they'll fall behind the Honus Wagner-Fred Clarke Pirates, the Bob Lemon-Early Wynn-Larry Doby Indians and the Cubs of the Tinker-to-Evers-to-Chance era. That's heady company.
Success in close games comes from a combination of skill and luck. On that much, we can agree. For most of baseball history, skill was given more subjective weight in the proportions for that formula. Then, as baseball research piled up in recent decades, luck began to be viewed as the predominant -- but not exclusive -- factor. What is the right answer?
There isn't one, really. Baseball is an ever-evolving game, and the rate of change the past few years has been dizzying. It seems at least possible that smart organizations have developed optimal strategies for excelling in close games. If that is indeed a thing that has happened, it seems highly likely that the team that would have developed those best practices would be the Tampa Bay Rays.
During the early round of the playoffs, Tampa Bay manager Kevin Cash was asked about this over and over, as the Rays' record in one-run games (it's currently 16-7 after they dropped their last two one-run games against the Astros in the American League Championship Series) reached hard-to-believe levels. Cash, analytical as he is, also is pretty rah-rah, and he insisted with a straight face that through the repetition of playing so many close games, the Rays have developed the trait of "knowing how to win."
With the Rays three wins from a championship, who is going to prove Cash wrong?
Before we start drilling into specific Game 2 situations and peppering you with metrics, let's consider this from the subjective. Why would the Rays be good in close games? They play good defense, which helps. Tampa Bay is not a great offensive team, but the Rays hit a good number of home runs. Then, as much as anything, Cash has an extremely deep, diverse, high-octane set of relief pitches he can deploy to navigate the middle to late innings.
Focusing on the pitching side of the formula, if you zero in on the Rays' performance this season, you can see that, indeed, no team was better. Tampa Bay's .254 wOBA allowed in crucial spots was easily the best mark in the big leagues.
A big challenge in this regard for the Rays in the World Series is an immovable rock/irresistible force quandary. Because in that exact area, the Dodgers' offense ranked second in the majors, clocking in with a high-leverage wOBA of .369. (San Diego topped the majors at .411.) Given L.A.'s overall edge in sheer firepower, if the Rays lose the high-leverage category while in run-prevention mode, it's hard to envision them beating the Dodgers three more times.
According to FanGraphs.com, there were 10 high-leverage plate appearances in Game 2 (plays with a leverage index of 1.5 or greater). Only one of those spots came with the Rays at bat, and when Joey Wendle hit a two-run double off Dustin May in the fourth, Tampa Bay won that encounter. That play had the largest impact on the final outcome of any play in the game.
Nevertheless, if you want to read the tea leaves left behind from Game 2, you'll want to zero in on the other nine high-leverage encounters, all of which came with the Dodgers at the plate.
SECOND INNING
Max Muncy led off with a walk off Rays starter Blake Snell. Tampa Bay led 1-0 at the time after the first of two Brandon Lowe homers. With Muncy representing the tying run and three outs to work with, it triggered three subsequent high-leverage chances in the inning against Snell. Will Smith struck out looking, and Cody Bellinger drew a medium-leverage walk. A.J. Pollock fouled out to first, and Enrique Hernandez struck out.
That's three high-leverage chances and not one competitive ball hit into play.
FIFTH INNING
With the Rays up 5-0, Chris Taylor's two-out, two-run homer off Snell was followed by a Mookie Betts walk and a Corey Seager single. That triggered a high-leverage moment for Justin Turner, who represented the tying run.
This is where the Rays began to flex their high-leverage might. Snell had been dominant through four innings before he was touched up in the fifth, and he was still at just 88 pitches. But Cash not only pulled Snell -- his No. 1 starter -- but also brought in his top reliever, righty Nick Anderson. That sequence is no longer surprising in today's game, especially when it's the postseason and especially when the Rays are involved, but it wasn't that long ago that such a progression of events would have left baseball television analysts speechless.
Anderson struck out Turner with a fastball.
EIGHTH INNING
The next time the leverage cranked up was the eighth, when the Rays' lead was trimmed to 6-4 on Seager's massive home run to center field to lead off the inning. Given the lateness of the frame and the two-run score differential, the leverage index once again creeped over the 1.5 cutoff, which is the statistical signal to start chewing on your fingernails.
Turner was the first batter to enter the high-leverage zone, and he doubled, though it was a Texas Leaguer that dropped in and got between two Rays outfielders. Muncy flied out routinely to right. Smith lined a smash to third that was caught for the second out, but with an exit velocity of 102.6 mph, at least it was a hard-hit (95 mph or higher) ball.
That brought Bellinger to the plate and Cash to the mound, as the moment called for a lefty. In this case, it was Aaron Loup, who got Bellinger looking to end the inning.
NINTH INNING
The Rays still nursed their 6-4 lead when the ninth began. Loup remained in to face Edwin Rios, though Cash could have summoned Diego Castillo to close things out. Loup had faced only one batter -- Bellinger -- but because that ended an inning, Cash could remove him without running afoul of the three-batter minimum.
Still, because Cash knew that Dave Roberts was down to Austin Barnes as the only remaining righty hitter on his bench, Cash stuck with Loup to face Rios. By bringing Loup back, the three-batter rule kicked back in, so Cash knew Loup would have to face the batter after Rios. That batter was Joc Pederson, who entered as a pinch hitter in the seventh. Or, if Roberts had wanted the platoon advantage, it would've been Barnes.
Here's the thing: Cash knew that the only surefire high-leverage at-bat of the inning was Rios. With the Rays up by two and nobody out, the leverage creeped over 1.5. But if Loup did his job in the lefty-lefty showdown with Rios, the leverage would fall beneath the threshold.
Loup struck out Rios.
Roberts sent Barnes to the plate, and Cash had to let Loup face him with the platoon disadvantage. But Barnes could have hit one to Laredo -- the Rays still would have had the lead. Plus, Cash had Castillo ready to close it out after Loup faced his third batter.
Loup got Barnes on a routine fly to left. Castillo came on and struck out Taylor for the final out, and the series was even.
To sum up those nine high-leverage chances for the Dodgers, they yielded five strikeouts, a foul out, a Texas League double, a routine fly out and one hard-hit ball: Smith's lineout in the eighth.
Is such a listing of results predictive? Is it sustainable? All we can say is that after yet another close win, the Rays are currently the best team ever at eking out close wins. Cash is as good as any manager in baseball when it comes to not just understanding the concept of leverage but also taking that understanding and turning it into actionable strategy. Not for nothing, Cash has a whole lot of good relief pitchers to make that strategy work.
That's the lesson from Game 2. The Dodgers, as great as they are, can't be shut out in high-leverage moments if they want to end their 32-year World Series title drought. They have to at least hold their own, which they failed to do Wednesday. If L.A. doesn't start winning some of those moments, this series will take a turn that would be surprising to most -- but certainly not to the Rays.