Trea Turner posted an amazing set of numbers in just 307 at-bats last summer. He is being selected in the first round of most drafts, usually ahead of the still-elite future Hall-of-Famer Miguel Cabrera.
Gary Sanchez posted an amazing set of numbers in just 201 at-bats last summer. He is being selected as the second-best catcher in all of baseball, behind only Buster Posey.
Seung-Hwan Oh saved 19 games with a 2.15 ERA during the second half of last year. He is being selected ahead of Craig Kimbrel, who has averaged more than 40 saves per season for six years.
Besides being drafted far ahead of what logic would dictate, there is one other thing these players have in common. They are all sophomores, going into their second full season in the majors.
Sophomores are a difficult group to evaluate. They have provided us only a single data point of performance to consider. That's a sample size of one. We would never project any other players based on one season of Major League statistics, yet that's all we have with sophomores, and it's often not even one full season.
What makes it worse is if that single data point is an outlier. Turner never hit more than eight home runs in any minor league season. He hit 13 in his short MLB stint last season and now has projections engines spitting out expectations that push him toward 20 in 2017.
If we pro-rate Turner's 2016 line to a full season, he'd have 23 HR, 59 SB and a .342 batting average. Are we really ready to dub him the next generational player, a la Mike Trout?
As it turns out, that is exactly what we did a year ago with Carlos Correa. Our inflated expectations off his rookie season pushed Correa to the No. 6 player off the draft board. He finished at No. 72. You'd think we would learn from experience.
But these small samples completely skew our perception of a player's true value. Combine that with recency bias, and drafters are completely pulled into the sophomore's skewed reality.
They see Oh's superior numbers over three months, which overshadow Kimbrel's slightly off year. They are more than willing to dub Sanchez as the savior of a tepid catcher pool, despite his .222 batting average over the final month, oddly enough.
A longer-scan view would correct this, but there is nothing to view. Incorporating minor league numbers would help, but they only serve to further discount these players' rankings.
The best you can do is review each player's individual situation and then decide for yourself.
Turner, Sanchez and Oh are great players, perhaps future stars, but they aren't likely to be statistical leaders in 2017. My own prudent expectation sees Turner putting up a 12-35-.280 line, which is perhaps second- or third-round-worthy, at best. Sanchez might hit 30 homers, but 25 would be more likely, and he could bat as low as .250-.260 -- think Brian McCann. And Oh could be a solid closer, with 30-35 saves and a mid-2.00s ERA. But you could project that line for any dozen other frontline closers.
There are many other sophomores who bear mentioning.
Nomar Mazara and Tyler Naquin both started out hot and faded down the stretch. Mazara was the more highly rated prospect, but Naquin ended up looking better by season's end. Mazara's ADP is currently No. 201; Naquin is No. 312. How much does a slightly clearer path to playing time outweigh better recent performance?
Alex Bregman is going No. 91 after hitting .264 and 8 homers in 201 at-bats last year. A top-rated prospect, this 23-year-old is ranked ahead of established veterans who are projected for similar numbers, such as Evan Longoria (No. 106) and Troy Tulowitzki (No. 157).
As older sophomores, Adam Duvall and Aledmys Diaz might be expected to regress in 2017. They are going just three spots apart -- Nos. 150 and 153, respectively. Are they actually better than established veterans who are being drafted later, such as Kendrys Morales (165), Adrian Gonzalez (166) or even Mike Napoli (217)?
Surface stats often obscure the true skill underneath. Michael Fulmer's line of 11 wins and a 3.06 ERA was elevated by a high strand rate and low BABIP and supported by a soft strikeout rate. His xFIP was only 3.95. Still, he is being drafted ahead of a more established starter in Dallas Keuchel, whose skill and track record belies last year's poor outlying surface stats.
Max Kepler might avoid sophomore misperception because he experienced the equivalent of three seasons of development during 2016. He went from MLB struggles to minor league adjustment to MLB success in six short months. At No. 237, the market is taking a cautious approach with him this spring.
This sophomore problem works in reverse as well.
One year ago, we were all champing at the bit, waiting for the Minnesota Twins to realize that their pitching staff was a mess. We were tucking away phenom Jose Berrios in anticipation of a quick call-up. That eventually did happen, but Berrios crashed and burned.
Today, Berrios has an ADP pushing 400. Has he completely lost his skill from one year ago? Not likely.
But where we end up being pulled in by the allure of the sophomore overachievers, we could be missing out on other opportunities. Those sophomores who struggle upon first call-up, or even slightly underperform expectations, present us with potential profit. Just follow the skill; the marketplace seems to be setting an alluring discount.