No matter what decision commissioner Rob Manfred rendered in the St. Louis Cardinals' hacking case, he was going to anger lots of folks. If his decision was perceived as being too hard on St. Louis, the Cardinals would be angry over the fact that, from their perspective, they were punished for the actions of someone who they say acted as a lone wolf. If Manfred didn't give the Houston Astros some form of compensation, then the Houston front office, the target of Chris Correa's federal crimes, would have thought it should have received relief.

Because of Manfred's friendship and perceived alliance with St. Louis chairman Bill DeWitt Jr., any penalty thought to be too light would be viewed as favoritism.

In the end, Manfred's decision to force the Cardinals to surrender $2 million and their No. 56 and 75 overall picks in the 2017 draft to the Astros probably offended rival evaluators, as a group, more than anyone else.

Some common observations and conspiracy theories that belong to officials in the industry:

1. The decision will have no impact as a deterrent. The level of the fine is unprecedented, as MLB notes. Rival evaluators note that a $2 million fine, within the context of a $10 billion industry and a franchise that generates hundreds of millions in revenue, is one flake in a snowstorm of money. Two million dollars is about half of the average salary of an MLB player.

In the eyes of a lot of evaluators, the practical impact of the loss of those two particular draft picks is negligible.

"When teams are deciding whether to go after free agents, what you always hear is that they don't want to give up a first-round pick," one evaluator said. "You see some teams willing to sign free agents if they have to give up a second-round pick -- and that's what the Cardinals gave up. It's not that big of a deal."

About the second pick surrendered, the No. 75 pick: It's a competitive balance pick that other clubs don't think the Cardinals should even have given the financial strength of the franchise, and it's a benefit that a lot of other teams don't have. In a sense, evaluators look at the loss of the No. 75 pick as something like a frequent traveler giving up special access to an airlines lounge: They're not giving up something that all teams value.

2. Some rival evaluators strongly believe that the Astros should not have been the beneficiaries in this case because they are being rewarded for doing a poor job with their internet security and they are being given a competitive advantage over their AL West rivals in getting the extra picks.

"It's not like the Astros were the only team hurt by the hacking," one evaluator said. "A lot of teams were, with the leaking of the trade information [on Deadspin]. Why didn't every team hurt by that get something?"

Another evaluator noted the cost of the security adjustments made by individual teams after the Deadspin story appeared.

"Why aren't the Cardinals paying everybody for that?" he asked.

3. Rival evaluators were furious that the Cardinals weren't stripped of a draft pick more meaningful, with many mentioning the 2018 first-round pick. St. Louis surrendered its 2017 first round-pick in signing Dexter Fowler, and in MLB's decision, the penalty was couched as "the two highest available selections" in the 2017 draft.

"Does that mean they would've had to give up their first- and second-round picks if they hadn't signed Fowler?" an evaluator asked. "If it was about taking their two highest picks, then why weren't they forced to give up the equivalent of a No. 1 pick" -- in 2018, when the Cardinals have a first-round pick again.

4. Some rival evaluators see the penalties as being shockingly thin relative to last summer's punishment of the Boston Red Sox over violations in the signing of international amateurs. Boston was stripped of players and given a one-year ban in participating in the market.

"What the Red Sox did was much more common [in baseball]," an evaluator said. "But Boston got whacked with something really tough. That was a big deal. What [Correa] did was a lot more serious -- it landed the guy in jail -- and the Cardinals weren't punished as much."

5. In light of how this played out, there is great industry cynicism over the timing of the Cardinals' decision to give up their first-round pick for Fowler. "This is an organization that has had a philosophy of not being willing to give up their first-round pick to sign free agents," noted a rival evaluator.

This is true. As ESPN researcher Sarah Langs notes, the last time that St. Louis gave up its first-round pick to sign a free agent was in 2002, when the No. 30 pick went to the Oakland Athletics for the Cardinals' offseason signing of free agent Jason Isringhausen. The A's selected Ben Fritz, who never made it to the majors.

In the 1999 draft, the Cardinals' No. 18 pick went to the Baltimore Orioles for the offseason signing of free agent Eric Davis. Baltimore took Rich Stahl, who never made it to the majors. In that same draft, the Cardinals got the No. 30 pick from the Braves for their offseason signing of Brian Jordan. Atlanta signed Jordan one year before St. Louis signed Davis, so the Cardinals already knew they had the Braves' first-round pick when they gave up their own.

Because of that history, frustrated rivals wonder if the Cardinals gave up their top pick with working knowledge that they were in jeopardy of losing it.

6. A lot of folks with other teams do not believe -- and will never believe -- that Correa did not share the information with one or more peers, especially in light of a general reference in his testimony that he did.

Manfred was in a no-win situation no matter what he chose to do, except for this: MLB and the Cardinals can now move on, surrounded by a chorus of angry grumbling.

The Astros got the picks and money, as Jake Kaplan writes.

For the Cardinals, the biggest loss in this is the stain on the team's reputation.

Chris Correa bore the brunt of the punishment, writes Tyler Kepner. The Cardinals got off lightly for the hack, writes Jeff Sullivan.

Cardinals team officials say this is the end of a long and challenging process, writes Derrick Goold. There are no winners and only losers in this case, writes Jose de Jesus Ortiz.