Twitter fuels this era of blame and after San Francisco’s ninth-inning meltdown Tuesday in a 6-5 loss to the Cubs in Game 4 of the National League Division Series, the Giants provided a target-rich environment. The most common complaint is that manager Bruce Bochy didn’t send Matt Moore out for the ninth inning, after he had thrown 120 pitches in the first eight innings. Santiago Casilla, a reliever with 127 career saves, was upset that he wasn’t given a chance in that fateful ninth inning. Dave Cameron wonders why Bochy didn’t trust one reliever in particular.
But this context is extremely important: Everybody in the Giants organization, from the folks in the front office to Casilla, had tried to plug the ninth-inning hole in the team’s bullpen for weeks. Months, even. They all recognized the problem, they all did what they could to find a solution, and in the end, they could not, and it ended their season.
Before the trade deadline, general manager Bobby Evans dug deeply into the trade-market possibilities. They wanted Andrew Miller as much as the Cleveland Indians wanted him and called the Yankees about Miller, fully recognizing how perfectly he could have fit. Miller could’ve served as their closer in August, September and October this year, and then, with Sergio Romo and others headed into free agency this fall, Miller could've led the bullpen in the last two seasons of his deal, 2017 and 2018.
But the Giants were never serious contenders for Miller because as the Yankees examined the trade possibilities, San Francisco did not have anything close to the caliber of prospects that the Indians, Cubs, Nationals, Dodgers or Rangers could offer. The conversations between the Yankees and the Giants about Miller and Aroldis Chapman never got serious because the Yankees preferred other offers from other teams.
This was a problem that the Giants could not overcome in the trade market. Mark Melancon was a good fit for San Francisco too, but as Pittsburgh weighed offers for the All-Star closer while hanging on the edge of the pennant race, the Pirates decided to move Melancon only if they could simultaneously add help for their own bullpen. Washington had the depth to offer left-hander Felipe Rivero, a young left-hander much coveted by other teams because of the quality of his changeup. The Giants could never match that.
The Giants' big bullpen acquisition turned out to be Will Smith, who was perhaps the fifth- or sixth-best reliever in the market. They wanted Miller, and, oh, they wanted him badly, but they had no chance. Their best offer wouldn’t have come close to matching what other teams were willing to give up.
So Brian Sabean and Evans, who had been so instrumental in making aggressive, adept in-season trade acquisitions in past pennant races, from Pat Burrell to Hunter Pence to others, could not get that lockdown closer they needed.
Bochy and pitching coach Dave Righetti did what they could, but time after time, the Giants' late-inning relief collapsed. The Game 4 meltdown wasn’t that extraordinary. Casilla blew three of his four save chances in September and lost the closer’s job.
Javy Lopez’s stuff was diminished this year, with his swing-and-miss rate down to a career-low 6.3 percent, so that not only were the Giants careful to make sure he was limited to facing left-handed hitters, but they also worked to ensure he faced the right type of left-handed hitters. Lopez’s walk rate this year was 5.1 per nine innings.
Scouts felt that Smith’s stuff was not as dynamic as it had been in the past, not as sharp, and that he is still recovering from his early-season knee surgery, and like other San Francisco relievers, he tended to pitch his worst when the pressure was at its greatest:
OPS vs. Smith
--High leverage: .755
--Medium: .631
--Low: .474
Derek Law has been the Giants’ best reliever since the All-Star break, but he was on the disabled list in early September, and the most pitches that he had thrown in any outing from Aug. 21 through Oct. 9 was 16. In Game 3 Monday, Law racked up 35 pitches. In Game 4, Bochy tried to steal an out with Law, matching him up against Kris Bryant, and Bryant singled.
Romo stepped into the closer’s role in the last week of the regular season, plugging that hole temporarily, but like Lopez, his stuff has been less than it was in the past and he has been vulnerable against lefties, allowing an OPS of .790. And in Game 3 Monday night, Romo allowed a game-tying two-run homer to Bryant.
Hunter Strickland had been given the closer’s role temporarily, but had a tough outing, and like Romo, he had problems with left-handers, who had an OPS more than 200 points higher than right-handers against him -- and as John Smoltz all but screamed during the Game 4 broadcast, Strickland sometimes tended to fall into the habit of throwing too many fastballs.
Bochy tried them to start innings, he tried them in matchups; he tried and tried. As Elias Sports Bureau notes, the Giants' nine losses when leading after eight innings led all major league teams in 2016.
In the ninth inning Tuesday night, Bochy mostly got preferable matchups.
Law against the right-handed hitting Bryant.
Lopez against the one left-handed hitter Joe Maddon wouldn’t lift for a pinch hitter, Anthony Rizzo.
Smith, who is generally more effective against right-handers than left-handers, wound up pitching to the right-handed hitting Willson Contreras.
Strickland worked against the right-handed hitting Javier Baez.
The only really unfavorable matchup Bochy wound up with was Zobrist against Romo, but at that point, he didn’t really have a great choice. And no matter who was on the mound, they kept giving it up. Bryant got a hit. Rizzo walked. Zobrist doubled.
Romo tried. Smith tried. Strickland tried. Lopez tried. Law tried. Bochy tried. Evans tried. They all tried. But in the end, their season and their elimination-game winning streak collapsed into that late-inning abyss that swallowed their season.
The Giants' season ended with another bullpen collapse, writes Henry Schulman.
Before the game, Bochy was asked who would get a shot at the save. He smiled and said, “I’ll tell you in the ninth.”
[Matt] Moore was not an option, even though he threw 133 pitches in his near no-hitter in Los Angeles last month.
“No,” Bochy said, “that’s a lot of work he did. At that point, where he’s at, he did his job. We were lined up. All our setup guys, everybody there, and he had gone far enough.”
The speed of the Cubs’ four-run rally stunned the Giants.
“It happened so fast,” said Conor Gillaspie, who had four hits Tuesday, including a single that started one two-run rally and an RBI single in another two-run rally.
“We had control of the game. In five minutes, everything changed.”
John Shea writes about the Giants’ bullpen collapse here. From his story:
They went a long way despite the bullpen, not necessarily because of it. That was the single biggest difference between Bruce Bochy’s championship seasons and this one.
How to explain it?
“How do you explain any of the blown games we’ve had with this bullpen?” asked rookie Derek Law, a talented 26-year-old whose emotions and towel waving served as a rallying cry in Game 3. “I don’t know. I don’t have an answer for you.”
This isn’t how the Giants’ playoff script usually ends.
From ESPN Stats & Information:
From Elias Sports Bureau: The Cubs had eight wins when trailing after eight innings this season, tying the Rangers for the most such victories in the majors.
The Cubs are the second team in postseason history to come back from a three-run deficit in the ninth inning to win a series clincher (From Elias: Mets in 1986 NLCS).
The Giants are the second team in postseason history to blow a three-run lead in the ninth inning when facing elimination (From Elias: Astros in Game 6 of 1986 NLCS).
The Cubs were 2-for-25 with two runs in the first eight innings, then went 4-for-6 with four runs in the ninth inning.
From Elias: Prior to Tuesday, teams that had a three-run lead in the ninth inning or later were 824-3 in the postseason, with all three defeats coming five days apart during the 1986 playoffs.